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ABSTRACT 
 
Canada’s Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie Delta Basin possesses significant energy resource 
potential. Decisions about energy development, however, are largely project-based and 
do not always provide an opportunity for more efficient and more effective regional and 
strategic approaches to development impact assessment and management. As such, there 
are constant messages about the need for a more regional and strategic form of 
environmental assessment, practiced above the project level and focused on broader 
planning-based assessment as a means to sustainability assurance.  The problem, 
however, is that there is no formal system of regional or strategic assessment (R-SEA) in 
northern Canada, and considerations as to what R-SEA is and what it should deliver are 
far from consolidated. The role of R-SEA must be better understood and a means found 
to make it a meaningful component and accepted and worthwhile part of planning, 
regulation and development decision-making.  The purpose of this thesis is to identify 
stakeholder understandings and expectations about R-SEA, and its potential roles and 
opportunities in Arctic energy planning and assessment.  Data were collected using semi-
structured interviews with knowledgeable stakeholders in Arctic oil and gas initiatives, 
including energy regulators, industry, and energy interest groups, as well as Inuvialuit 
governments and community boards.   
 
Four key themes are identified and discussed: the efficacy of the current approach to 
environmental assessment for offshore energy development; knowledge of R-SEA; R-
SEA benefits and risks; and opportunities and challenges to advancing R-SEA in the 
Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR). Only consultation and engagement was seen by most 
participants as working well within the current EA system in the study area.  Many 
challenges were raised, however, which would indicate a need for a new or revised 
approach to EA in the study area.  There was agreement on the need for a more regional 
and strategic approach to EA in the ISR, but there was no consensus amongst participants 
as to the nature and scope of R-SEA and what it is intended to deliver.  Though there 
continues to be much confusion regarding the terminology used, it appears that 
participants are identifying the same deliverables and advantages, suggesting that they are 
looking for similar benefits.  Challenges to moving such a process forward include 
leadership, coordination of interests, financial resources, legislated versus voluntary 
approaches, and human capacity in the ISR region.  Future research is needed to address 
the perceived risks and challenges raised by participants for R-SEA to be a worthwhile 
and effective process. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Environmental assessment, Arctic energy, Resource development, Beaufort 
Sea 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Environmental Assessment (EA) is broadly defined as a tool for identifying, predicting, 
evaluating, and mitigating the potential environmental impacts of a specific development 
project before major decisions and commitments about that project are made (Hanna, 
2009).  In Canada, EA is required at the federal level under the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, as well as under the various laws of the provinces and territories.  In the 
Canadian North, EA is administered also under various land claims agreements, 
including the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act in the Mackenzie Valley of 
the Northwest Territories, and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in the Beaufort Sea area 
(Galbraith et al., 2007).   
 
The typical purpose and focus of EA is the integration of environmental considerations in 
project-based planning and decision-making in support of sustainable development 
(Noble, 2010).  However, while EA has emerged as an important environmental 
management tool in project planning, it is widely criticized for having too narrow a scope 
to achieve its sustainability objective (see Gibson and Hanna, 2009; Gibson, 2002; Noble, 
2002; von Seht, 1999).  In practice, EA typically functions within a narrowly defined 
spatial and temporal context – that of the individual development project (Dubé, 2003). 
This project-based approach to EA reduces its ability to effectively manage the impacts 
of development that typically occur over a much larger, regional scale (Harriman and 
Noble, 2008).  As a result, EA is primarily a tool for mitigating the potential 
environmental effects of a pre-determined development project (Partidário, 2000), rather 
than a forward-looking tool to identify and plan for alternative futures (Noble and 
Harriman, 2009).   
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There are now constant messages from government, industry, science and academia on 
the need to advance EA towards a more regional scale, beyond the individual 
development project, and to the earliest stages of development decision-making processes 
(e.g, BSStRPA, 2007; CCME, 2009; Jenkins, 2008; Noble, 2002; Thérivel et al., 1992).  
This higher-order form of regional EA, referred to as Regional Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (R-SEA), is defined by Harriman Gunn and Noble (2009: 260) as “…a 
process designed to systematically assess the potential environmental effects, including 
cumulative effects, of alternative strategic initiatives, policies, plans, or programs for a 
particular region.” Emerging out of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
principles (see Vicente and Partidário, 2006; Partidário, 1996), R-SEA was formally 
adopted by the Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment (CCME, 2009) as a 
regionalized model of SEA; an effort to extend SEA in Canada beyond the formal federal 
Cabinet Directive (see CEAA, 1999) and to provide a framework to facilitate more 
regional-based EA and planning initiatives to address environmental issues at the 
strategic1 levels of decision-making.  In this regard, R-SEA allows for sustainability 
objectives and broad alternatives to be included in the decision-making process, and 
focuses attention on identifying and assessing alternative development futures for a 
region rather than just predicting and mitigating the impacts of individual projects 
(Harriman and Noble, 2008).  The overall purpose of R-SEA then is to allow for more 
informed development decisions in support of sustainability (CCME, 2009).   
 
Part of the challenge to advancing R-SEA, however, is that basic understandings of what 
SEA is and what it should deliver, including regional applications of SEA, are still far 
from consolidated (Noble, 2009; Vicente and Partidário, 2006; von Seht, 1999).  This is 
particularly the case in Canada’s Arctic energy resource sector.  Since Canada’s 
withdrawal in 1984 from the National Energy Program, the Canadian government has 
adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach to planning for future Arctic development (Harrison, 
2006).  This has left the proponents who wish to develop in this resource sector to deal 
with outstanding issues within the Arctic region (see Jenkins, 2008), including, for 
example, issues of regional economic development, negotiating impact benefit                                                         1 See Chapter 2 for a description of strategic in the context of environmental assessment. 
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agreements, and assessing potential cumulative environmental change.  Although various 
forms of strategic and regional EA are advancing in the international energy sector, 
including Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Chaker et al., 2006; 
World Bank, 2005), Canada has no formal system of R-SEA for Arctic oil and gas 
planning and development (Harriman and Noble, 2008).  Canada’s Arctic region is at the 
threshold of major energy development and, as such, there is a need and opportunity to 
develop and implement a system of R-SEA to allow for environmental protection as well 
as socio-economic and cultural impact management, benefits-sharing, sustainability2, and 
cumulative effects assessment before project development decisions are made (see 
BSStRPA, 2007).  
 
1.1 Research Purpose and Objectives 
 
Before a worthwhile, effective and accepted process of R-SEA can be developed and 
utilized in Canada’s Arctic regions, there is a need to first determine exactly what R-SEA 
is and what it can and should deliver (see Noble and Harriman, 2008; Vicente and 
Partidário, 2006) in the context of Arctic oil and gas development initiatives.  Currently, 
the nature, potential roles and benefits of strategic and regional EA initiatives in Arctic 
energy planning and development are largely unknown (Noble, 2009).  For example, 
what is the role of R-SEA in project impact assessment and development decision-
making? What do different stakeholders, including industry, government, and Arctic 
communities, hope to achieve by implementing a system of R-SEA? Who should be the 
responsible authority, and are there mechanisms to ensure that strategic outcomes 
influence project actions? 
 
Based on a case study of the oil and gas industry in Canada’s Beaufort Sea, the overall 
purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential roles of and opportunities for R-SEA in 
the planning and assessment of Arctic energy initiatives.  This will be accomplished 
through the following research objectives, to:                                                         2 See Chapter 2 for a description of sustainability and sustainable development in the context of environmental assessment. 
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1. examine stakeholder knowledge of, and expectations about, strategic and regional 
EA for Arctic energy resource planning and development decision making; and  
2. identify the perceived opportunities for and barriers to a system of R-SEA for 
Arctic oil and gas exploration and development. 
The focus of this research is on the Beaufort Sea offshore area of the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Region, as defined in the Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action 
(BSStRPA, 2007)3. 
 
1.2 Thesis Format 
 
This thesis is presented in five chapters, including the Introduction.  Chapter 2 provides a 
general overview of EA, SEA, and R-SEA in Canada, as well as past and present energy 
development initiatives in the Beaufort Sea region.  Chapter 3 describes the study area, 
and the research methods. Results of the semi-structured interviews with study 
participants are presented and discussed in Chapter 4.  Finally, study conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 5 as well as directions for further research.   
                                                        3 See Chapter 3 for a description of the study area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Environmental assessment (EA) is now practiced in more than 100 countries around the 
world, and there is a considerable volume of literature on the subject.  The focus of the 
following sections is on the Canadian EA system and, in particular, the limitations to 
project-based EA and the need for a more regional and strategic approach.  The notion of 
strategic environmental assessment (SEA) is introduced, including its principles and 
objectives, and the current state of practice of SEA is reviewed.  Next, regional strategic 
EA (R-SEA) is discussed, along with its origins and potential benefits.  Finally, the 
Canadian Arctic energy context is presented with respect to looming oil and gas 
development in the Beaufort Region, and the opportunity to implement R-SEA for the 
sustainable development of Arctic energy resources.  
 
2.1 Environmental Assessment 
 
Environmental assessment was first introduced in the United States by the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970.  In Canada, EA emerged in the early 1970s as a policy 
requirement to screen for potential pollution effects of developments (Herring, 2009), and 
was legislated in 1992 at the federal level under the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act (CEAA, 1992) – one of the purposes of which is to facilitate decisions about 
development that promote sustainability.  In the context of this thesis, sustainability is 
seen as a process, and not an end point.  Sustainable development includes ‘opportunities 
to protect and enhance the environment and the economies, culture and health of 
indigenous communities and of other inhabitants of the Arctic, as well as to improve the 
environmental, economic and social conditions of Arctic communities as a whole’ 
(SDWG, 2009: 1).  It can also refer to development that meets the needs of the present, 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (CEAA, 
2010).  
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The practice of EA has evolved considerably over the past 30-plus years. Gibson (2002: 
152), for example, notes that EA “has moved towards being earlier in planning, more 
open and participative, more comprehensive, more mandatory, more closely monitored, 
more widely applied, more integrative, more ambitious, and more humble.” At the same 
time, however, EA is criticized as falling short of meeting its sustainability mandate (e.g. 
Noble, 2002; von Seht, 1999); there appears to be a growing dissatisfaction, if not 
“disillusionment. . . and scepticism that impact assessments are contributing to better 
decisions” (Fuggle, 2005: 1).  
 
Numerous authors have written about the challenges to EA in terms of public 
involvement (Diduck and Sinclair, 2002), monitoring (Morrison-Saunders and Bailey, 
1999), and various other process elements (e.g. Cashmore, 2004; Hanna, 2009; Kellar 
and Hanna, 2009; Sadler, 1996).  However, the main challenge to EA is that the process 
itself is largely reactive and constrained to the assessment of individual development 
projects and to project-by-project decision-making (Partidário, 2000). The subject of EA 
is typically an individual infrastructure project (e.g., an oil and gas pipeline), and the 
focus is often on mitigating, to the point of acceptability, the project’s potential effects on 
the receiving local environment (Noble, 2010). EA at the project level is implemented too 
late in the decision making process to influence decisions about development options, 
and to explore alternative development futures (Gibson, 2002; Partidário, 2000).  
 
The most important decisions concerning development often occur before projects are 
identified, during the formulation of policies, plans and programs (PPPs) - decisions not 
typically subject to EA (Bina, 2007). For example, decisions made regarding a regional 
land-use management plan will likely shape the future development of that region, the 
types of projects that will be allowed to develop, and the potential cumulative 
environmental effects of development. As such, Noble (2010: 251) argues that “EA in the 
absence of more strategic and regional processes is inherently constrained in its ability to 
facilitate decisions about development that are consistent with the broader principles of 
sustainability.”  To advance the sustainability initiative in EA requires the application of 
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EA beyond the scope and scale of individual projects to a more regional scale and to the 
strategic levels of PPP decision-making (Sadler, 1996).   
 
2.2 Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 
Strategic environmental assessment has been ongoing in Canada since the early 1980s, 
and as a formal process, separate from project-based EA requirements, since 1990.  In the 
context of this thesis, strategic refers to a strategy or scheme for development and 
decision-making, which means SEA, then, is a process or means that leads to a strategy 
for action (Noble, 2000b).  Strategic levels of decision-making, according to Noble 
(2000b, 206), include “the set of principles and objectives that shape the visions and 
development intentions incorporated in a set of alternatives, policy, plan or programme”.  
Strategic levels of decision-making move past the level of project EA, to an earlier and 
higher level of environmental planning.   
 
The origins of SEA can be traced to programmatic assessments under the US National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1970.  It was not until the World Commission on 
Environment and Development report, Our Common Future (1987), however, and the 
United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (1992), that SEA started to gain 
international momentum as a formal approach to EA, separate from traditional project-
based EA (Noble, 2002).  Canada is recognized internationally as a country that has made 
significant contributions to the development of SEA (see Table 1) (Noble, 2002).  
Introduced as a policy requirement under the federal Environmental Assessment Review 
Process of the 1980s, in 1990 Canada developed the first, formal requirements for SEA - 
The Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program 
Proposals (see Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005).  Under this Directive, every PPP 
proposal submitted to a minister or cabinet for approval, which may result in either 
positive or negative environmental effects, is required to have an SEA (CEAA, 1999). 
The Directive was updated in 2004 to provide procedural support to federal departments 
and agencies so as to ensure compliance with the Directive. In an attempt to bring the 
SEA approach into a regionalized context, where SEA can be applied outside the scope 
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of the federal Cabinet Directive, the Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment in 
2008 commissioned a research initiative to develop a regional SEA framework and 
supporting principles and methodology.   
 
In principle, SEA is intended to have a tiered-forward effect meaning that the benefits of 
SEA application to higher-level policies trickle down, affecting plans and programs, and 
eventually influencing decisions about individual projects (Fischer, 1999). SEA is thus 
intended to be utilized early in the decision-making process to ensure full consideration 
of alternative options when there is still enough flexibility to influence decisions before 
irreversible ones are made (Noble and Harriman-Gunn, 2009).  In this way, SEA is 
proactive, and under it questions like ‘what is the preferred option’ or ‘what is the desired 
attainable end’ are asked, rather than it being used to simply predict the most likely 
outcomes of a predetermined type of project action (Noble, 2002).   
 
In practice, however, SEA appears to have fallen short of its promise. No formal SEA 
systems exist in Canada outside of the federal Cabinet Directive (Dalal-Clayton and 
Sadler, 2005) and, at the provincial level, SEA is not practiced in any structured way.  
When practiced, SEA is often interpreted as either an extension of the regulatory EA 
process or ad hoc regional environmental studies (see Noble, 2009).  Recent reviews of 
the state of SEA practice in Canada suggest that SEA is not meeting its potential as a 
higher-order EA tool in support of sustainability (see Gibson, 2002). For example, Noble 
(2009: 146) reviewed 10 case applications of SEA across Canada, both formal and 
informal, and found “considerable variability in SEA experience and value added,” 
noting that the systematic separation of SEA from downstream decision inputs, or project 
based EA, and assessment activities is particularly concerning.   
 
There are several reasons for the current state of SEA.  These have been widely addressed 
in the academic literature, and are not unique to the Canadian context (see, for example, 
Thérivel, 2009; Thérivel and Walsh, 2006; Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005; Fischer, 
2003).  In addition to the lack of tiering in SEA, and its influence over downstream 
project decisions, as discussed above, limitations to SEA practice include the lack of 
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political will, methodological challenges, and the lack of agreement on what it is that 
SEA is supposed to deliver.   
 
Table 1: Evolution of Federal SEA/R-SEA in Canada.  
 
1984 • The Canadian federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process 
Guidelines Order wrote EA into PPPs, but it was not manifest in practice 
• ‘Proposal’ is defined as including any initiative, undertaking or activity for 
which the federal government has a decision-making process 
1990 • Canadian Environmental Assessment Act bill introduced (PPPs not included 
within its scope) 
• Reform package for EA that included a new EA legislation and an EA process 
for new policy and program proposals that required SEA: Cabinet Directive on 
the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program proposals 
1991 • Environmental Assessment I Policy and Program Planning: A Sourcebook was 
released, which was the first Federal government initiative in the development 
of a system of SEA 
1992 • Canadian Environmental Assessment Act receives legislative approval 
1993 • Cabinet Directive regarding the EA process for policy and program proposals 
were released 
• An internal review of the Cabinet Directive revealed that SEA was poorly 
understood, and application was inconsistent at best 
1995 • Federal government releases Strategic Environmental Assessment: A Guide for 
Policy and Program Officers 
1998 • Parks Canada acknowledges and pledges compliance with the Cabinet 
Directive in their Management Directive 
1999 • Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency released its revised Cabinet 
Directive on SEA and guide to the SEA process. 
2000 • Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency  stated developing a framework 
for regional environmental effects assessment as a priority  
2001 • Canada’s first SEA is published by the Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore 
Petroleum Board for the offshore oil industry 
2004 • Guideline on the Cabinet Directive on SEA is updated 
2008 • Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment (CCME) commences 
development of a regional strategic environmental framework for Canada 
2009 • CCME released its guidance on R-SEA 
Source: Noble, 2002; Noble and Harriman, 2008.   
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2.2.1 Political will 
 
The basic lack of political will is a significant challenge to the SEA process.  
Governments have resisted SEA, for various reasons, but mainly because they are 
unhappy with its basic idea (Gibson, 2002).  In other words, accepting and applying an 
advanced EA process (to regions, or to PPPs) will force decision-makers to accept a 
much broader, and mostly unfamiliar set of EA obligations and objectives, to be placed 
under greater public scrutiny, and risk loosing some of their independence and authority 
(Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005; Gibson, 2002; Partidário, 2000).  Gibson (2002: 156) 
sums it up as follows: “effective assessment requirements are meant to challenge 
conventional assumptions and conventional practices, and they are resisted for that 
reason.”  A strong political commitment is necessary to ensure that SEA is activated early 
in development decision-making (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005); however, there is 
limited appreciation from both governments and proponents of SEA’s potential to move 
assessment ‘upstream’, or at the level of PPPs, and doubts about the robustness of results 
(Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005).  Political resistance, however, is not unique to R-SEA, 
but rather, there is resistance in general to policy shifts or to policies and actions that may 
expose government decision processes.   
 
 
2.2.2 Methodological approach 
 
Added to the largely institutional and political challenges to SEA is the lack of consensus 
on, and demonstrated application of, SEA methodology (Wallington et al., 2007; 
Partidário, 2007; Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005; Noble, 2002).  On one hand, various 
authors have argued that SEA requires a highly structured assessment methodology that 
can deal with the complex and non-linear processes that are typical of regional and 
strategic level decision-making – including uncertain futures, alternative scenarios, and 
cumulative effects over multiple spatial and temporal scales (Herrera, 2007).  On the 
other hand, Brown and Thérivel (2000) argue that a broad range of SEA methodologies 
be utilized in the PPP-making context, and that SEA should be thought of in terms of “an 
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array of tools from which the appropriate one(s) can be selected to meet the needs of the 
particular circumstances”.  Partidário and Clark (2000) agree, stating that SEA must be 
absolutely tailor-made to the kind of decision at stake, and the nature of the decision-
making processes in place.  In short, there is no consensus as to how much structure 
versus how much flexibility is acceptable in SEA methodology and application (see 
Retief, 2007).   
 
2.2.3 SEA roles and expectations 
 
Arguably, the most fundamental challenge to SEA is a basic lack of consensus on what 
SEA is and what it should deliver.  Practitioners, regulators, and academics remain 
divided on the fundamental principles of SEA, including the roles it can and should play 
in decision making, and what SEA can actually deliver in support of sustainability 
(Noble, 2009; Bina, 2007; Herrera, 2007; Wallington et al., 2007; Vicenté and Partidário, 
2006; Fischer, 2003; Noble, 2003; von Seht, 1999). Most agree that SEA involves the 
early consideration of environmental issues in PPP decision-making (Noble, 2000), but 
SEA is variably discussed in terms of a ‘tiered, nested, or sequential’ framework 
(Barrow, 1997), an ‘issues driven’ and ‘participative’ approach (CSIR, 1996), and an 
‘extension of project-based EIA’ upstream to higher levels of decision making (Court et 
al., 1994).   
 
The variation in SEA has also led to some confusion with non-SEA experts about what 
SEA is (Verheem and Tonk, 2000). As Vicenté and Partidário (2006) note, “some 
interpretations of SEA are more concerned with the capacity of SEA to influence 
decisional contexts and the formulation of strategic initiatives, whether policies, plans or 
programmes (e.g., Partidário and Fischer, 2004; Bina, 2003; Nilsson and Dalkmann, 
2001)…others tend to streamline the SEA process as a standard sequence of activities, 
centered in the preparation of an SEA report that culminates in the key purpose of 
informing, and validating, a final decision (e.g., Thérivel, 2004; European Directive, 
2001/42/EC).”  Tonk and Verheem (1998) go so far as to characterize SEA as one 
concept, multiple forms, reflecting on the lack of consensus on the subject.   
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There is also an array of expectations placed on the SEA process, and, as such, it is 
unlikely that SEA will meet each one simultaneously and in any given application (Bina, 
2007).  For example, SEA cannot be expected to replace project-based EA – SEA is 
focused on PPPs and regions, not projects, and, ideally, EA should be the next step after 
the SEA is completed (Noble, 2010).  SEA was never designed to identify effects that are 
specific enough to replace an EA.  Also, SEA cannot deliver on its promise of cumulative 
effects assessment if it is implemented in a system that has neither the regional models 
nor institutional framework necessary to implement and sustain it (Harriman and Noble, 
2009).  With this diversity, many who implement and use SEA processes remain to be 
convinced of its value (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005).   
 
If SEA is to continue to advance, the nature and added value of SEA needs to be apparent 
to both decision-makers and proponents (Partidário, 2000).  Brown and Thérivel (2000) 
argue that all players must agree upon the concept of SEA. Part of the challenge, 
however, is that SEA research has focused largely on methodology (e.g. Dalal-Clayton 
and Sadler, 2005; Thérivel, 2004; Noble and Storey, 2001), while the diversity of 
stakeholder expectations and the roles of SEA in the environmental assessment 
continuum are still not clearly defined (Bina, 2007). SEA needs to be better understood if 
it is to be welcomed into decision-making for resource planning and development, and if 
the anticipated outputs and results expected can actually be delivered (Dalal-Clayton and 
Sadler, 2005). 
 
2.3 Regional Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 
Regional strategic environmental assessment (R-SEA) is based on combining the 
principles of regional assessment, CEA, and SEA, and was formally adopted by the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment (CCME, 2009) as a regionalized model of 
SEA.  R-SEA emerged out of basic SEA principles (see Vicenté and Partidário, 2006; 
Partidário, 1996), and was developed in Canada as an effort to extend SEA beyond the 
formal federal Cabinet Directive and to provide a framework to facilitate a more 
regional-based EA and planning approach so as to address environmental issues at the 
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strategic levels of decision-making.  Harriman-Gunn and Noble (2009) describe R-SEA 
as “a process designed to systematically assess the potential environmental effects, 
including cumulative effects, of alternative strategic initiatives, policies, plans, or 
programs for a particular region.”  As PPPs become increasingly sensitive to 
sustainability needs (Noble and Harriman, 2008), and as the federal and territorial 
governments more willing to consider innovative approaches to EA, it seems timely to 
consider R-SEA as an effective approach to incorporating sustainability goals with future 
development scenarios for regions.   
 
The overall intent of R-SEA is therefore to facilitate a more proactive and integrated 
approach to SEA, operating at the regional scale specifically and facilitating cumulative 
effects assessment (Noble and Harriman, 2008). Its overall purpose is to allow for more 
informed development decisions in support of sustainability initiatives (CCME, 2009).  
R-SEA allows for sustainability objectives and broad alternatives to be included in the 
decision-making process for regional resource planning and development, and focuses 
attention on identifying and assessing alternative development futures for a region rather 
than just predicting and mitigating the impacts of individual projects (see Table 2) 
(Harriman and Noble, 2008).  As R-SEA is intended to guide the development of PPPs 
and strategic initiatives above the project tier, eventually influencing specific project 
design and development decisions, R-SEA is reserved for complex and fairly significant 
regional planning and strategic decision making contexts (Noble and Harriman, 2008).  
The core principles of R-SEA are its strategic nature; cumulative effects driven, and 
regionally focused approach (Harriman-Gunn and Noble, 2009).  It is an expectation that 
the preferred regional strategies and PPPs are adaptive, and will be altered as needed as 
monitoring progresses, as new knowledge is gained, or as the vision of the region 
changes (Harriman-Gunn and Noble, 2009).   
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Table 2: Potential benefits of R-SEA. 
 
• Facilitates the development of improved PPPs and strategic initiatives 
• Provides a more regional focus for development and decision-making 
• Ensures that CEA is captured at the appropriate tier and scale 
• Contributes to regional sustainability goals 
• Enables and encourages data sharing from regional and project impact monitoring programs 
• Facilitates state-of-the-region environmental monitoring and reporting  
• Saves time and resources by providing a means to streamline subsequent project EA 
• Establishes goals, thresholds, or maximum allowable limits against which to conduct 
project-based performance and impact assessment 
Source: Noble and Harriman, 2008; Harriman Gunn and Noble, 2009.     
 
R-SEA is different from other types of regional environmental studies and impact 
assessments. Aside from a basic understanding of these differences and the role and 
intent of R-SEA (see Harriman-Gunn and Noble, 2009; Noble, 2009), other challenges to 
advancing its adoption and practice include the lack of triggers or responsible authorities 
to ensure that R-SEA is done, the lack of a ‘home base’ or lead agency, and the lack of 
mechanisms to ensure that the results of R-SEA actually influence decision making, 
specifically at the project-level EA (Harriman-Gunn and Noble, 2009).  Though R-SEA-
like applications have been adopted for energy planning and development in terrestrial 
landscapes in Canada’s south, such as in the Great Sand Hills of Saskatchewan (see 
Noble, 2008), similar initiatives have not advanced for offshore energy planning and 
development in Canada’s Arctic regions.  
 
2.4 Towards a System of R-SEA in Canada’s North 
 
Various forms of R-SEA are advancing internationally in the energy resource sector.  In 
the Gulf of Mexico, for example, SEA is practiced regionally under the auspices of 
programmatic EA within the National Environmental Policy Act. Here, a programmatic 
EA is conducted by the United States’ Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (formerly the Minerals Management Program Office) to assess the 
potential environmental impacts of, and alternatives to, major offshore oil and gas 
development programs.  In the United Kingdom, approximately eight SEAs have been 
completed for offshore regions for oil and gas licensing. SEA for offshore energy 
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development licensing in the United Kingdom is required under the European Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Directive (European Directive, 2001/42/EC).  The purpose of 
the EC Directive with regard to offshore oil and gas is to assess the potential impact of 
the offshore oil and gas licensing rounds, which are the periods where proponents are 
asked to bid on lease blocks in the ISR, and to promote environmentally sound 
development of offshore hydrocarbon resources.   
 
In the Canadian context, a system of SEA does exist for the offshore energy sector in 
Atlantic Canada, under the direction of the Canada-Newfoundland and Canada-Nova 
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Boards (CNSOPB, 2010).  In this region, SEA is conducted 
by the petroleum boards and crown corporations of the government of Canada, to identify 
potential environmental issues, such as marine sensitive areas and the impacts of 
exploration, prior to opening offshore areas for licensing.  In this region, SEA is 
conducted in compliance with the federal Cabinet Directive and all subsequent projects in 
the SEA areas require a project-specific EA prior to development approval.  In the 
Canadian northern territories and offshore Arctic regions, however, there does not exist a 
formal system of SEA for energy resource planning and development. Energy resource 
development is planned and assessed largely under project-based impact assessment, 
including, for example, the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act in the 
Northwest Territories, and under the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in the Beaufort Sea area 
of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region.  
 
2.4.1 Planning for energy development in the Beaufort Sea: Past and Present 
 
The Beaufort Basin, consisting of the Beaufort Sea and the Mackenzie Delta, in Canada’s 
Arctic is rich in hydrocarbon resources (Harrison, 2006), and is at the threshold of major 
energy development.  This is not a new situation in the Beaufort, however, as the region 
has been on the verge of development, it seems, since the early 1900s (Table 3).  Energy 
development began in the Canadian Arctic with the discovery of oil at Norman Wells in 
1919 by Imperial Oil Ltd. (INAC, 2009).  Exploration increased in the southern NWT 
and at Normal Wells during the 1940s and 1950s, followed by exploration in the 
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Canadian Arctic when the federal government opened the area to oil and gas exploration 
(NEB, 2009) in the 1960s (INAC, 2009).  This, along with rapidly rising energy prices, 
led to a surge in interest by oil and gas companies.   
 
The majority of exploration drilling activity to date in the region occurred in the 1970s 
and 1980s (NEB, 2009).  To secure a voice in deciding the future of the Beaufort Sea 
region, the Inuvialuit recognized the need to enter into an agreement with the 
Government of Canada, thus leading to the creation of the Committee for the Original 
People’s Entitlement (COPE) in 1974, which fought to settle the outstanding land claims 
in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR).  This ten-year initiative lead to the signing of 
the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) in 1984 (Joint Secretariat, 2001), which set aside 
906,430 square kilometers of land known as the ISR, as well as granting the Inuvialuit 
surface and subsurface titles to 35,000 square kilometers of land in the ISR (CAPP, 2009; 
IRC, 2011).  This settlement of native land claims had a major influence on hydrocarbon 
development in the Beaufort in the 1970s (CAPP, 2009), leading to the establishment of a 
range of regulatory and advisory agencies consisting of both government of Canada and 
Inuvialuit representation (CAPP, 2009).   
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Table 3: Summary of Regional Environmental Reports in the Beaufort Region 
 
Date Program/Report 
1970s-1990s Environmental Studies Series published by INAC 
• Over 70 research reports, much of which concerned research related to oil and gas 
1970s-present Program of Energy Research and Development (PERD) 
• Designed to address environmental and technical issues related to hydrocarbon 
development across Canada 
1970s-present Environmental Studies Research Funds (ESRF) 
• Assists in the decision-making process related to oil and gas exploration and 
development on Canada’s frontier lands 
1970s-present NWT Cumulative Impact Monitoring Program (NWT CIMP) 
• A number of monitoring and capacity-building projects have been completed 
during development of the ISR 
1974 The Berger Inquiry 
• Assessed the proposed pipeline for the Mackenzie Valley 
1975 Environmental Impacts of Arctic Oil and Gas Development process 
• Initiated by the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada 
1977 Cabinet Directive for the Beaufort Sea Project Technical Resource Series 
• Examined the consequences of a possible oil spill from drill ships 
1982 Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Beaufort Sea 
Hydrocarbon Production and Transportation Proposal 
• Prepared by a consortium of oil and gas proponents led by Dome Petroleum 
1983-2004 Arctic Environmental Sensitivity Atlas 
• Revised in 2004 
1983-1987 Beaufort Environmental Monitoring Project (BEMP)  
• Identified and assessed potential environmental effects of offshore and near-shore 
oil and gas development 
• Identified important information gaps and appropriate studies to fulfill these gaps 
1984 Beaufort Sea Hydrocarbon Production and Transportation Proposal: Report of the 
Environmental Assessment Panel 
• Detailed recommendations on the Beaufort Sea EIS 
1984 Northern Oil and Gas Action Plan (NOGAP) Beaufort Environmental Monitoring Program 
(BEMP) 
• A 7 year federal government research and planning program 
• Intended to advance the state of preparedness for hydrocarbon development in the 
Beaufort Sea 
• Identified and assessed potential environmental effects of offshore and land-based 
oil and gas development 
• Identified important information gaps and appropriate studies to fulfill these gaps 
1985-1987 Mackenzie Environmental Monitoring Project (MEMP) 
• Identified and assessed potential environmental effects of onshore and near-shore 
oil and gas development 
• Identified important information gaps and appropriate studies to fulfill these gaps 
• Focus was mainly in the Mackenzie Valley along the proposed pipeline corridor 
1991 Beaufort Sea Steering Committee 
• A report to the DIAND regarding issues arising from the Environmental Impact 
Review Board Review of the Isserk and Kulluk Drilling Program Applications 
1991-1994 Beaufort Region Environmental Assessment and Monitoring Program (BREAM) 
• Combined and coordinated the efforts of BEMP and MEMP within a common 
framework 
• Involved governments, industry and Aboriginal people and co-management 
organizations 
1991 A community-based regional land use plan developed for the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta 
Region 
• Formed the basis for the current community conservation plans for each of the six 
communities within the ISR 
1992 Considerations in the Design of Effects Monitoring Strategies, Beaufort Case Study 
1996-2005 Oceans Act (1996) 
Canada’s Oceans Strategy (2002) 
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Oceans Action Plan (2005) 
• All were done to improve oceans management and preserve the health of marine 
ecosystems 
• The ISR forms one of the five Large Ocean Management Areas under the Oceans 
Action Plan 
2002-2009 Federal Northern Oil and Gas Research projects for the Mackenzie Gas Project and induced 
oil and gas activities 
• INAC, Environment Canada, DFO, NRCan 
• Federal government is funding 69 million dollars for northern oil and gas science 
research projects 
2003-present ArcticNet 
• Funded by the Canadian Networks of Centers of Excellence 
• Intensive, long-term, multidisciplinary climate variability research program 
• Designed to accelerate scientific investigation into the many natural, social and 
health science issues and consequences in the North 
2004-2007 Beaufort Sea Strategic Regional Plan of Action (BSStRPA) 
• Set out to address regional data gaps related to offshore oil and gas activities 
• To provide detailed scientific and socio-economic information to all stakeholders 
to support regulatory decision-making 
2008-present Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment (BREA) 
• Intended to provide information on the entire Beaufort region to support decision-
making and simplify project-level EA 
Source: CAPP, 2009; BSStRPA, 2008.   
 
Alongside these developments, in 1974 the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
(commonly known as the Berger Inquiry, see Table 3) began preliminary hearings across 
the NWT and Yukon in response to the two pipeline proposals for the transport of natural 
gas from the Beaufort Sea to southern markets in Canada and the United States (CAPP, 
2009).  Formal hearings began in 1975, and were concluded in 1976.  In 1977, the Berger 
Inquiry proceeded with recommendations for a ten year moratorium on the development 
of a Mackenzie Valley pipeline until three conditions were met: (1) land claims were 
settled; (2) land use planning was in place; and (3) social and environmental concerns 
were addressed (Taylor et al., 2010).   
 
Amongst other major initiatives in the region, in 1980 the Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (DIAND) asked the Minister of the Environment to hold a formal 
public review, under the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP), for oil 
and gas production and transportation in the Beaufort Sea (BSEAP, 1984).  In 1982, on 
behalf of over 40 companies holding exploration permits in the Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie 
Delta region, Dome Petroleum Ltd., Esso Resources Canada Ltd., and Gulf Canada 
Resources Ltd. prepared and submitted an environmental impact statement (EIS) on a 
project that aimed to produce and transport hydrocarbons from the Beaufort 
  19 
Sea/Mackenzie Delta region (BSEAP, 1984).  Thus, the Beaufort Sea Environmental 
Assessment Panel (BSEAP) set about reviewing the environmental impact statement 
(EIS) and associated documents from the proponents (BSEAP, 1984).  In 1984, the 
review concluded that the project was acceptable if subjected to terms and conditions, 
and carried out in small phases, with intensive research and careful monitoring (BSEAP, 
1984).   
 
The National Energy Program (NEP) was created in 1980 with a goal to achieve self-
sufficiency as well as to increase Canadian ownership in the oil and gas industry (Flynn, 
2010).  To encourage exploration, the Canadian government instituted generous packages 
for oil and gas companies, pouring in millions of dollars, sometimes even reimbursing 
companies 100% of their exploration expenses (Flynn, 2010).  One of the most 
significant discoveries to date in the Beaufort region, the Amauligak oil field, was 
discovered during the 1980s (CAPP, 2009).  This discovery, along with others, lead to the 
development of the Northern Oil and Gas Action Program (NOGAP), which was initiated 
in 1984, and was a cooperative funding program developed by the federal government 
and industry to fund important research on oil and gas technology and the environment 
(CAP, 2009).   
 
In 1984, Canada withdrew from its former National Energy Program, and from then on 
has adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach to future Arctic development (Harrison, 2006).  This 
has left any proponents who wish to develop in the ISR to deal with outstanding issues 
within the Arctic region.  After the government of Canada dismantled the NEP, and cut 
funding to the NOGAP program (between the years of 1988-1990), there was a decline in 
Arctic exploration in the mid-1980s, and complete abandonment by the early 1990s 
(Flynn, 2010; CAPP, 2009).  It was also diminished by falling world oil prices (CAPP, 
2009).   In 1990, the idea of a large integrated impact assessment was proposed by 
Environment Canada with the objective of assessing climate change scenarios on the 
Mackenzie Basin region, its lands, waters, and the communities that depended on them 
(Cohen, 1997).  The assessment, known as the Mackenzie Basin Impact Study, was a six-
year research effort with results of the study published in 1997 (Cohen, 1997).   
  20 
 
In 1993, NOGAPs funding was cut, exemplifying industries’ low interest in energy 
development in the ISR (CAPP, 2009).  However, rising oil prices in the late 1990s 
created renewed interest in oil and gas exploration in the Canadian Arctic (Flynn, 2010).  
With this, the Canadian government made announcements regarding the new lands 
available for exploration in 2000 (Flynn, 2010).  The majority of the renewed interest in 
oil and gas initiatives in Canada’s Arctic stems from the Mackenzie Delta Gas Project, 
which aims to run a pipeline from the Beaufort Basin south towards the Northwest corner 
of Alberta (DFO/INAC, 2008).  An application for a pipeline that would transport oil and 
gas discovered at Taglu, Parsons Lake, and Niglintgak, known as the Mackenzie Gas 
Project, was made in 2004 (CAPP, 2009).  As of 2011, the review process is ongoing and 
no decision has been made (CAPP, 2009).  However, almost no oil and gas has been 
commercially produced from the Beaufort Region, despite the proved resource potential 
(CAPP, 2009).   
 
In 2004, the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC) wrote to the Minister of the Environment 
and requested that the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency undertake a strategic 
regional environmental assessment of the future of the Beaufort Sea offshore oil and gas 
initiatives (BSStRPA, 2007).  This launched the process to develop the ‘Beaufort Sea 
Strategic Regional Plan of Action’ (BSStRPA).  This plan of action set out to address 
regional data gaps related to offshore oil and gas activities, and provide detailed scientific 
and socio-economic information to all stakeholders to support regulatory decision-
making (BREA, 2010).  This was a collaborative effort with the Inuvialuit, co-
management bodies, industry, and the governments of Canada and the NWT (BSStRPA, 
2008).  BSStRPA’s recommendations included the need to improve regulatory efficiency 
and effectiveness, the need for optimizing benefits and mitigating environmental, social 
and cultural impacts, and the need for planning for the future (CAPP, 2009).   
 
Recently, there has been some movement on a more regional approach to EA in the 
Beaufort Sea in the form of the draft Beaufort Regional Environmental Assessment 
framework (BREA, 2010).  Based on comprehensive discussions stemming from the 
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BSStRPA, a consensus has emerged that a more regional EA for the Beaufort Basin 
should be conducted (BREA, 2010).  According to BREA (2010), the proposed Beaufort 
Regional Environmental Assessment “is the most efficient and practical approach to 
addressing regional priorities associated with oil and gas activities in the Beaufort Sea.”  
The two stated purposes for the BREA are to: 1) address regional data gaps related to 
offshore oil and gas activities; and 2) support regulatory decision-making by providing 
detailed scientific and socio-economic information to all stakeholders.  The key goal for 
BREA is to provide information on the entire Beaufort region to support decision-making 
and simplify project-level EA (BREA, 2010).  Included within the BREA report is the 
2008 Environmental Science Research Fund (ESRF) report, “Biophysical Research 
Requirements for Beaufort Sea Hydrocarbon Development”, another comprehensive 
report that looked at the Beaufort Sea petroleum development (CAPP, 2009), and the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) report, “ Beaufort Sea Large Ocean 
Management Area; Ecosystem Overview and Assessment”, also identifying data gaps in 
the Beaufort Sea (CAPP, 2009).   
 
The need for an advanced form of EA in the Beaufort region is now recognized by 
Aboriginal groups (Gwich’in, Inuvialuit), Arctic communities, industry, governments and 
academics alike (DFO/INAC, 2008; Jenkins, 2008).  The most recent regional and 
strategic effort in the ISR, BREA, shadows the idea of an R-SEA; however, the proposed 
BREA framework does not appear to mirror the objectives and intent of R-SEA.  BREA 
appears focused on gathering information for oil and gas development in the Beaufort 
region, rather than on identifying and assessing alternative options for oil and gas 
planning and development.  The approach is similar to that of Atlantic Canada, under the 
Canada-Newfoundland and Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Boards, where the 
focus is on baseline data provision, which has been heavily criticized for its lack of 
strategic approach and limited influence over development (see Noble, 2003).  Further, 
the draft plan also does not fully specify what it intends to deliver to all stakeholders and, 
as such, expectations about the role BREA will play are largely unknown.  There are 
similar unknown expectations, challenges and opportunities for R-SEA, and it is 
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important to outline these from the perspectives of the stakeholders involved if an 
effective and worthwhile EA tool and management plan are to proceed.   
 
Not only may BREA not be meeting the expectations of R-SEA, but the recent oil spill 
crisis in the Gulf of Mexico has prompted the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation to release 
a letter to the Minister of DIAND and the chairman of NEB requesting a pause on all 
offshore hydrocarbon drilling activity in the Beaufort Sea (IRC, 2010).   The Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation (IRC) stated that they will not support any further oil and gas 
development in the ISR until industry and the Government of Canada demonstrate the 
ability to: (1) prevent an uncontrolled blow-out during all offshore drilling operations; (2) 
stop an uncontrolled blow-out in a timely and effective manner; and (3) contain and 
clean-up all hydrocarbons from an uncontrolled blow-out in a timely and effective 
manner (IRC, 2010).  The IRC stressed the need for further research on the impacts of 
hydrocarbon exploration in the ISR offshore region (IRC, 2010).  It seems timely then, to 
consider implementing a management tool like R-SEA in the Beaufort Basin region to 
allow for environmental protection as well as socio-economic and cultural impact 
mitigation, benefits-sharing, sustainability, and cumulative effects assessment 
(DFO/INAC, 2008; World Bank, 2005). 
 
 
2.5 Synthesis 
 
The traditional project-based approach to EA does not allow for sustainability objectives 
to be pursued effectively, due in large part to the limited scope of project-specific 
assessments and the reactive nature of project-level decisions.  In response to the 
limitations of EA conducted solely at the project scale, there has emerged considerable 
interest in more strategic-led approaches to EAs at the regional scale – specifically R-
SEA. Though a new and promising environmental management tool, understandings of 
what exactly R-SEA is and what it can and should deliver are still far from consolidated. 
Regional and strategic-like systems for EA do exist in offshore energy regions in Atlantic 
Canada and internationally, but no similar such system exists in Canada’s Arctic. 
Arguably, there is a particular need to determine the opportunities for and the role of R-
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SEA in Canada’s Arctic, where the environment is more sensitive to change and where 
major oil and gas development is looming.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This thesis examines stakeholder knowledge of and expectations about R-SEA in the 
planning and assessment of oil and gas initiatives in the Beaufort Sea.  To do this, a 
qualitative research approach was taken based primarily on semi-structured interviews 
with industry stakeholders.  In this chapter the Beaufort Sea study area is first described, 
followed by the methods used for data collection and analysis.   
 
3.1 Study Area 
 
The study area consists of the Beaufort Sea region of Canada’s Northwest Territories 
within the ISR boundary (see Figure 1).  Oil and gas activity in this region has focused on 
both offshore drilling in the Beaufort Sea and onshore drilling in the Mackenzie Delta 
region. The focus of this research is on offshore planning and development in the 
Beaufort Sea, specifically that area of the Beaufort Sea defined by the Beaufort Sea 
Strategic Regional Plan of Action offshore planning area (see BSStRPA, 2007).  
 
The Northwest Territories (NWT) has a land mass area of 1,171,918km2 (GNWT, 2000). 
It is a cold regions environment and glaciations have played a large role in shaping the 
landscape (GNWT, 2000).  Geological events and geomorphic processes have created 
various land formations such as lowlands, hilly terrain, mountains, rock-scattered 
bedrock, patterned ground, slumping, and alpine glaciers (Bone, 2003).  Permafrost 
developed in the study region approximately 16,000 to 25,000 years ago with the low 
temperatures associated with the late Wisconsin ice advance. The ice advance also 
covered the land with a continental ice sheet that depressed the earth’s crust and, as it 
advanced, eroding it to create various land formations.  The region is also showcased by 
unique natural features such as pattern ground, pingos and pack ice (Bone, 2003). 
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Figure 1: The Inuvialuit Settlement Region in the Beaufort Sea in Canada.   
Source: Joint Secretariat (2011). 
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The ISR is situated within the Arctic biome, characterized by a cold and dry climate 
(Bone, 2003) and continuous permafrost (GNWT, 2000).  The area is rich in biological 
diversity, including plankton, benthic fauna, macrophytes, marine and anadromous fish 
(Arctic char, salmon, Arctic cod, etc), birds (geese, loons, etc), terrestrial mammals 
(caribou, moose, grizzly bears, mountain goat, arctic fox, gray wolf, wolverine, lynx, 
black bear, cougar, arctic hare, beaver), and marine mammals (beluga whale, bowhead 
whale, ringed seal, bearded seal, polar bear, walrus, etc) (GNWT, 2000; Kavik Axys Inc. 
et al., 2008). The environment in the ISR, both on and offshore, is often described as 
‘sensitive’ (Anderson and DiFrancesco, 2007), requiring a significantly longer time to 
rebound from human-induced disturbances in comparison to the warmer regions of the 
south.  This fragility means that the risk of anthropogenic damage is just that much higher 
(Bone, 2003).  About 99,000 square kilometers of protected areas and conservation zones 
comprise about 7.3% of the NWT land base (GNWT, 2009). 
 
There are 11,422 people residing within the ISR, and of these 73% are Inuvialuit, First 
Nations, or Métis (Stats Can, 2011). Inuvialuit means ‘the real people’ in Inuvialuktun, 
and many of the 5,000 Inuvialuit people today reside in the communities of Aklavik, 
Inuvik, Paulatuk, Sachs Harbour, Tuktoyaktuk and Ulukhaktok (Holman) (IRC, 2011).  A 
large part of the Inuvialuit people’s diet is derived from the harvesting of local fish and 
wildlife, with geese and muskox hunting in the spring and fall, whaling and fishing in the 
summer, and caribou hunting in the fall and winter (IRC, 2011).  Fishing and hunting of 
local natural resources have provided sustenance, as well as a part of the Inuvialuit 
culture of the ISR for centuries, and continue today (Knopp, 2010).  At least half of the 
NWT residents still hunt and fish in the ISR region (GNWT, 2009).  Approximately 40-
60% of the ISR residents rely on country food for at least 75% of their meat and fish 
(GNWT, 2009).  
 
The NWT’s economy is expected to continue to be dependant largely on non-renewable 
resource development, which currently includes the production of oil and gas, as well as 
gold, silver, tungsten, uranium, lead/zinc and diamonds (GNWT, 2009). Vast quantities 
of oil and natural gas are present in the sedimentary rocks of the Mackenzie Delta, as 
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well as in the shallow, and more recently deeper, continental shelf rock of the Beaufort 
Sea.  The oil and gas-rich Beaufort Sea region is the continuation of the Western Canada 
Sedimentary Basin, which extends up from the Alberta-British Columbia border (INAC, 
2011).  The Beaufort Sea, however, is relatively under-explored in comparison to 
northern Alberta and BC (INAC, 2011).  The most significant oil reserve in the offshore 
region in the ISR is the Amauligak well site, located 70km offshore at a depth of about 30 
meters, with reserves estimated at 350 million barrels (Anderson and DiFrancesco, 2007).  
The Arctic region, however, is estimated to contain 30% of the remaining world’s 
undiscovered gas reserves (Taylor et al., 2010).   
 
Currently, there are 18,800 x 107 liters of discovered oil, and 458.7 x 1012 liters of 
discovered natural gas in the NWT and Arctic offshore area (INAC, 2009).  The Beaufort 
Sea/Mackenzie Delta region in the ISR is estimated to have 39.7 x 107 liters of potential 
oil, and 679.6 x 1012 liters of potential natural gas (Anderson and DiFrancesco, 2007). 
Energy production in the NWT by value was estimated to be 58 million dollars of natural 
gas, and 438 million dollars of oil in 2001 (Bone, 2003).  As of 2009, there were 12 
exploration licences and 39 significant discovery licences in the Beaufort Sea (INAC, 
2009); but, even with all of the oil and gas resource potential there have been zero 
production licences issued (INAC, 2009).   
 
Demand for natural gas in the future is expected to push natural gas prices up (Taylor et 
al., 2010), which would indicate that production could eventually become economically 
viable in the Arctic.  A strong demand for oil and natural gas products, as well as rising 
prices and new technology are all driving forces behind newfound interests in oil and gas 
exploration in the IRS (CAPP, 2005).  With this potential development looming, it is 
timely to assess the environmental regulatory process and the stakeholders involved to 
see if a more regional or strategic approach could be used in development planning.   
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3.2 Environmental Assessment in the offshore ISR 
 
Environmental assessment in the ISR is regulated under both the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement.  The Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act may apply to any project where the government of 
Canada has ‘decision-making authority’ (including as a proponent, land manager, source 
of funding, or regulator), provided that project is not included on the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act Regulations Exclusion List (CEAA, 2011). The federal 
Act provides the legislative framework for EA within the ISR. However, all 
developments in the ISR are potentially subject to EA under the IFA, regardless of their 
size or magnitude of impact. When a federal authority is involved, a project can trigger 
both the federal and IFA EA processes, with decisions and various approvals for energy 
developments often undertaken in cooperation with the federal authorities responsible for 
energy development in the region, including the National Energy Board (NEB), the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC).  Oil and 
gas resources in the NWT, and the processes for the development of those resources, are 
managed largely by INAC (Taylor et al., 2010).  It is in this way, in INAC’s role as 
resource managers, that the federal government grants companies the right to develop oil 
and gas resources in Canada’s Arctic (Taylor et al., 2010).   
 
3.2.1 ISR organization and co-management structure  
 
Within the ISR regulatory system, under the IFA, two parallel organizational structures 
exist: the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) and the Inuvialuit Game Council (IGC). 
The IRC is comprised of six community corporations, one representing each of the six 
communities in the region, namely Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Sachs 
Harbour, and Holman Island.  The IRC is the primary corporate body of the ISR, and 
facilitates cooperation between the six community corporations and the Inuvialuit Land 
Corporation, the Inuvialuit Investment Corporation, the Inuvialuit Development 
Corporation, and the Inuvialuit Land Administration (The Community of Aklavik et al., 
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2008). The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development implements the 
legislation of the IRC on behalf of the Government of Canada (Joint Secretariat, 2004).  
 
The IGC was established in 1978, representing also the six Inuvialuit communities, and 
the collective Inuvialuit interest in the ISR on wildlife management issues (IGC, 2003).  
The IGC works with several co-management bodies created under the IFA (see Figure 2), 
and works parallel with the IRC (IGC, 2003).  Each community has its own Hunters and 
Trappers Committee (HTC), each of which has representation on the IGC.  The HTCs, 
amongst other things, are responsible for local resource (wildlife) allocation, and are 
expected to encourage and promote Inuvialuit involvement in the regulatory process (The 
Community of Aklavik et al., 2008).   
 
The Inuvialuit and the governments of Canada, the NWT, and the Yukon share 
responsibility for managing the ISR through various co-management bodies. The Joint 
Secretariat (JS) acts as an administrative liaison between the co-management bodies, as 
well as the IGC.  The JS was incorporated in 1986, and its objective is to support and 
facilitate the interest and activities of the wildlife and environmental councils, 
committees and boards, established under the IFA (Joint Secretariat, 2003).  The JS 
members and directors are made up of the five chairs of the five co-management 
committees and was established to enhance cooperative management between the 
Inuvialuit, and the governments (see Figure 2).  These co-management groups are 
intended to have equal government (both federal and territorial) and Inuvialuit 
representation (INAC, 2005).   
 
The Wildlife Management Advisory Councils (WMACs) provide advice to federal and 
territorial governments on issues relating to wildlife in the ISR. The WMACs are also 
involved in research on various species and on Inuvialuit traditional ecological 
knowledge. The Fisheries Joint Management Committee was established to advise the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans on matters relating to Inuvialuit and the ISR fisheries 
resources (INAC, 2005).  The Fisheries Joint Management Committee (FJMC) works 
jointly with DFO to co-manage all fish, fish habitat, and marine mammals within the ISR, 
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and is responsible for collecting harvest information and making recommendations on 
subsistence quotas for fish and harvestable quotas for marine mammals within the ISR 
(Joint Secretariat, 2009).   
 
 
Figure 2: The co-management system of environmental regulation in the ISR.  
Source: Joint Secretariat, 2011. 
 
The Environmental Impact Screening Committee (EISC) was established in 1986 and has 
since screened over 700 development proposals, ranging from oil and gas seismic and 
drilling programs, to commercial river trips (Joint Secretariat, 2009).  The EISC 
implements the screening portion of the IFA Environmental Impact Screening and 
Review Process (EISC, 2008).  It works closely with the EIRB, and consists of seven 
members, including its chair; three appointed by the IGC, and one nominated by each of 
the Government of Canada, the Yukon Territorial government, and the government of the 
NWT (GNWT) (EISC, 2008).  All developments in the offshore and onshore Crown 
lands within the ISR are to be submitted for screening, according the IGC under Section 
11(1)(c) of the IFA (Joint Secretariat, 2004).   
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The Environmental Impact Review Board (EIRB) also operates within the scope of the 
IFA, and acts primarily as the review body for any proposed development referred to it 
by the EISC (Joint Secretariat, 2004). The Inuvialuit communities have the opportunity to 
document their values and land use practice recommendations within the Community 
Conservation Plans; one for each of the six communities within the ISR (Joint Secretariat, 
2004).  They also have the right to request an EA on any development proposal within 
the ISR as per the IFA (Joint Secretariat, 2004).  The federal Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development is responsible for appointing three members to the 
Inuvialuit EIRB, one from Canada, one from the Government of the Yukon, and one 
from the GNWT, and is also responsible for funding the EIRB (Joint Secretariat, 2004). 
 
3.2.2 The Regulatory EA system in the ISR 
 
The ISR offshore region is managed primarily by INAC, who decides to develop an area 
by sending out a call for bids.  When INAC does this, the bid is one of three types: 
exploration, significant discovery, or production licences, and the Arctic Aboriginal 
groups are notified and are provided the opportunity to identify culturally or 
environmentally sensitive areas (INAC, 2009).  Proponents have a maximum of nine 
years to conduct an exploration licence, with a drilling requirement in the first of two 
terms.  If the proposed development receives approval, a significant discovery licence is 
issued, enabling the successful proponent indefinite tenure to the discovery.  There have 
been no production licences issued to date in the ISR; if one were issued it would provide 
a 25 year term to the successful applicant with automatic renewals if the development is 
still producing (INAC, 2011).   
 
Any development or activity of consequence to the ISR requires screening under the IFA 
if significant negative impacts on the environment or wildlife harvesting are expected 
(EISC, 2008).  The IFA takes precedence over any other federal, territorial, provincial, or 
municipal law in the ISR concerning the screening of development proposals to the 
extent of any inconsistency or conflict between them (EISC, 2008).  There is a two-stage 
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process under the IFA that involves the screening of all development proposals to 
determine whether there is the potential for significant negative environmental impact, 
and, if there is, subjects that proposal to further detailed public assessment and review.  
 
The EA process is triggered when a project is proposed. The developer will consult with 
the various advisory and co-management bodies (e.g. FJMC, IGC, HTCs, DFO, INAC, 
etc) to determine whether the project is deemed a ‘development’ under Section 2 of the 
IFA. If it is not deemed a ‘development’ then the license/permit can be issued.  If the 
project is determined to be a ‘development’ then the proponent will begin the necessary 
application procedure for the required licences and permits.  For oil and gas projects in 
the ISR, the developer also applies to the NEB, which is the primary responsible federal 
regulatory body, thus potentially triggering also the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act.  Any water and land use permits are also applied for at this stage.   
 
The IFA requires screening of all developments of consequence to the ISR that are likely 
to have a negative impact on the environment, or on present or future wildlife harvesting. 
The EISC carries out these environmental screenings (EISC, 2008).  Once the EISC has 
reviewed a proposal it has one of four choices: (1) that the development will have no 
significant negative impact and may proceed without EA and review; (2) that the 
development, if authorized is subject to terms and conditions recommended by the EISC, 
will have no such significant negative impact and may proceed without EA and review; 
(3) that the development could have significant negative impact and is subject to EA; or 
(4) that the development proposal has deficiencies of a nature that warrant termination of 
its consideration and submission of another project description (EISC, 2008).  If the EISC 
finds that the project will have no significant impacts, the project will be allowed to 
proceed and licences or permits will be issued, with or without recommended terms and 
conditions.  On Crown lands, non-Inuvialuit bodies such as DIAND are responsible for 
attaching conditions to land use permits (The Community of Aklavik et al., 2008).  If the 
project is determined to likely have a significant negative impact, the proposal will be 
subjected to further EA and review by the EIRB (Joint Secretariat, 2004).  The majority 
of projects are assessed at the screening level. 
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If forwarded to the EIRB, the proponent must develop the environmental impact 
statement (EIS). Once the EIS is received by the EIRB the chair will designate a review 
panel, which will carry out a public review (EIRB, 2004).  The Government of Canada is 
responsible to identify the ‘government authority competent to authorize the 
development’ for each proposal being reviewed by the EIRB, and the review panel 
consists of two permanent members appointed by Canada, two permanent members 
appointed by the Inuvialuit, and the chair of the EIRB (EIRB, 2004).  The public review 
hearings are generally held in the community most affected by the proposed development 
(Joint Secretariat, 2009).   
 
After gathering its information, the EIRB will prepare a final report with its 
recommendations on whether or not the development should proceed (along with any 
terms and conditions, including mitigation and remedial measures), and submit it to the 
appropriate federal authority (Joint Secretariat, 2009).  The federal authority responsible 
for allowing the project to proceed must accept, reject, or modify the recommendations 
from the EIRB. Once cleared of the EIRB process, required permits and licenses may be 
issued (Joint Secretariat, 2009).  The federal government is a significant participant in the 
co-managed EA process in the ISR, and ultimately retains the final say over which EIRB 
recommendations for development are approved. The federal government possesses the 
spending power, control over territorial expenditures, the regulatory authority to 
determine Arctic energy outcomes, and effectively has the power of a veto in the ISR 
regulatory process.  
 
Projects subject to EA under the direction of the EISC and EIRB may also trigger the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, provided there is a federal authority involved 
and a trigger for the Act (see Noble 2010). When the federal act is triggered, a project 
proponent must meet the requirements of both the EIRB under the IFA, and the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act under the Government of Canada. There are four types of 
federal EA, namely screenings, comprehensive study, mediation, and assessments by a 
review panel.  Most assessments are routine screenings.  A comprehensive study may be 
  34 
required if the proposed project is large in scale or in environmentally sensitive areas, 
which includes mandatory public participation.  Mediation can be conducted when the 
Minister of the Environment thinks that a consensus may be possible between involved 
parties for any unresolved issues.  Projects may be ‘bumped-up’ to a review panel when 
the environmental effects of a proposed project are uncertain or likely to be significant, or 
when warranted by public concerns.  Bilateral harmonization agreements can also be 
arranged to help prevent duplication by ensuring a project is only subject to a single 
environmental assessment that meets the legal requirements of all jurisdictions involved, 
and includes the use of a joint review panel (CEAA, 2011).  There is also provision under 
the IFA for the EA process of the EIRB to be substituted for a panel review under the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The primary means of data collection was semi-structured interviews. Interviews are “a 
conversation with a purpose” (Valentine, 2005:111) and are useful for collecting a 
diversity of opinions and experiences, providing insights into differing opinions, as well 
as revealing consensus on some issues (Dunn, 2000). Semi-structured interviews were 
used in this research to explore current stakeholder knowledge of EA systems and 
practices for oil and gas development in the Beaufort Sea, and to identify potential 
opportunities for and challenges to advancing a system of R-SEA.  With a semi-
structured interview there is some degree of predetermined order of questions, but there is 
also enough flexibility to allow the participant to choose the way in which issues are 
addressed (Dunn, 2000).  This enabled comparisons to be made between interviews, 
while ensuring informants had the opportunity to expand on their thoughts.   
 
There are four prominent groups involved with oil and gas initiatives in the study area:  
Arctic community boards and agencies (e.g., Inuvialuit Game Council, Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation); government regulators  (e.g., National Energy Board, Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, Government of the Northwest Territories, 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Environment Canada, and Indian and Northern 
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Affairs Canada); industry (e.g., Canadian Association of Petroleum Products, 
ConocoPhillips Canada, Imperial Oil); and ENGOs (e.g., Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, Pembina Institute, World Wildlife Federation). Potential interviewees were 
identified from these four groups based on their experience and select knowledge of the 
study area and of its environmental regulatory process.  An initial list of participants was 
identified with help from a number of key informants from the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers, Connoco Phillips, the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Agency, and the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation.  A snowball sampling design was then 
used, whereby initial interviewees were asked to identify other potential participants as 
the research progressed (see Valentine, 2005).   
 
A total of sixty potential participants were contacted via email or telephone with an 
invitation to participate in the study. An April 2009 workshop in Calgary, focused on 
cumulative effects assessment frameworks in the Beaufort region, was also attended to 
meet potential interview participants and to gain insight as to the current state of affairs 
of regional and strategic EA initiatives in the study area.  A total of 28 interviews were 
conducted from 13 April 2010 to 15 October 2010, ranging from 15 minutes to three 
hours in length (see Table 4). Interviews were conducted both in-person and over the 
telephone with industry, federal regulators, and ENGOs, depending on the geographic 
location of the participant.  Interviews with Arctic community boards and agencies were 
mainly in-person at Inuvik.   
 
Interviews focused on five main themes, namely:  perceptions of the current state of 
practice of EA and the regulatory approach to offshore oil and gas assessment and 
regulation in the Beaufort region; knowledge of regional and strategic EA; requirements 
to advance a more regional and strategic approach to EA in the Beaufort; challenges to 
doing so; and lessons learned from efforts to date.  Results were analyzed qualitatively, 
allowing for identification and interpretation of themes emerging from the data (Corbin 
and Strauss, 2008).  The data collection phase was considered complete once the point of 
saturation was reached and key themes and ideas started to repeat.   
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Table 4. Research participants organized by group.   
Group Organization # Interviewed 
Government   
 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency 2 
 Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2 
 Government of NWT 1 
 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2 
 National Energy Board 2 
  Parks Canada 1 
Industry   
 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2 
 ConocoPhilips Canada 1 
  Imperial Oil 1 
ENGOs   
 Pembina Institute 1 
  World Wildlife Federation 1 
Northern boards  and Agencies  
 Co-Management Board 1 
 Fisheries Joint Management Council 2 
 Inuvialuit Game Council 2 
 Inuvialuit Regional Corporation 4 
  Joint Secretariat 3 
 
 
Interviews were recorded with a combination of note-taking and audio-tape. 
Hypertranscribe © software was then used, a software that allows for audiotape looping, 
to transcribe the interviews into text documents.  Once the data were transcribed the 
information was thematically coded and analyzed using NVivo © qualitative software.  
Higher-level concepts were first grouped into themes of shared properties, thus allowing 
a reduction and combination of data (see Corbin and Strauss, 2008).  This was followed 
by microanalysis: a detailed coding process within themes based on emerging concepts, 
also known as coding down (Lockyer, 2004).  Analysis was concluded once the point of 
saturation in themes emerged.  Corbin and Strauss (2008) explain the point of saturation 
as ‘when no new data are emerging’, as well as the point where categories are developed 
according to their properties.   
 
Finally, it is important to note the research biases and limitations.  Not all stakeholders in 
the ISR were available to be interviewed, which reduced the scope of data gathered.  
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Also, time and financial constraints did not allow for all interviews to be in person, so 
phone interviews were used as a substitute, to the possible detriment of the quality of 
participant responses.  Coding was done with the author’s personal bias potentially 
eliminating or affecting some of the themes that emerged, which could have slightly 
biased the results and conclusions.  The author tried to be aware of these limitations and 
biases as much as possible, and tried to keep their effects to a minimum.   
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS and DISCUSSION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
Results of the semi-structured interviews are presented and discussed thematically in this 
chapter.  First is an examination of participant’s perceptions of the current state of 
practice of Environmental Assessment (EA) in the Beaufort region.  The next theme 
reports on participant’s knowledge and expectations of regional and strategic EA.  The 
third theme examines regional and strategic EAs’ potential value-add to offshore oil and 
gas planning and development, while the fourth theme discusses the risks and perceived 
‘value-lost’ of implementing regional and strategic EA.  The chapter concludes by 
looking at the opportunities and challenges to advancing a more regional and strategic 
approach to EA in the Beaufort region.   
 
4.1 Perceptions of the Current State of Practice of EA in the Beaufort Region 
 
Participants were asked to discuss the efficacy of EA – what they considered to be 
working well with regard to EA for oil and gas in the Beaufort region, the main 
challenges to the current practice, and whether these observations were true for both 
offshore and onshore environments.  The strongest theme that emerged with regard to 
‘what’s working’, identified by nearly half of the study participants, was consultation and 
engagement.   
 
Consultation and engagement were identified as strong features of current EA practice in 
the Beaufort Region, as one participant commented: 
“There’s good engagement between industry and the NEB.  I believe also 
between industry and the Inuvialuit.  I think they are consulting with the 
Inuvialuit quite a bit on how they are planning to approach their applications and 
ultimately their projects…for exploration.  So I think the dialogue is working 
well” (Government, INAC). 
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Another federal regulator spoke about the good engagement with the Inuvialuit 
community, noting that it “is probably one of the main ingredients right now, that they 
are plugged directly into the regulatory process” (Government, CEAA).  Only one 
participant from the industry indicated that the current regulatory system provided good 
protection for the Inuvialuit community, stating that “the current regulations for the 
offshore Beaufort are adequate...we have a good system when it comes to…protection of 
the people”.  Most participants from industry did not express this view, with some noting 
that the system “basically works up in the offshore,” but “generally, we don’t have a lot 
of flattering things to say about the regulatory system in the north” (Industry, CAPP). 
One Environmental Non-governmental Organization (ENGO) participant with direct 
involvement in northern affairs for oil and gas development agreed with the federal 
government in that there is good consultation and engagement with the Inuvialuit, noting 
that “what’s right about the process so far is actually the Inuvialuit part, at least through 
the environmental impact steering committee.”  
 
Participants from many of the Inuvialuit boards and agencies were divided regarding 
‘what is working’ about current EA.  Many noted good stakeholder engagement and 
consultation, while others simply went directly to ‘what is not working’.  For example, a 
member of one Inuvialuit co-management board commented: 
“I think that the bodies that the Inuvialuit have set up, sort of as a result of their 
land claim, like the environmental impact screening committee, the environmental 
impact review board, and the various co-management boards under the land 
claim, have been working for twenty five years now, and I think they do work 
well.” 
A member of the Inuvialuit Joint Secretariat similarly commented: 
“With the nature of how things work up here, I do think that there is much more 
consultation that’s happening up here than there would probably anywhere else.  
Especially something that is as big as oil and gas development, which I know that 
in other parts of the country, Aboriginal groups would barely get a meeting.  That 
is the environment, and the political environment that is up here, that is set in 
place, but its also because the community demands a voice, and they realize they 
have a voice, so they want to use it, and I think that’s one of the biggest steps is 
that they still have a desire to speak out.”  (Inuvialuit Boards and Agencies, Joint 
Secretariat) 
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Other comments like “I can tell you what’s not working” and “I don’t see very much 
working these days at all,” were common amongst the Inuvialuit board and agency 
participants.   
 
There were several additional observations that were not raised by every participant, but 
are important to note.  One participant from DFO, for example, thought that the current 
system allowed for adaptive management; another participant from Parks Canada thought 
that the process was very clear, not only to their agency, but to all stakeholders involved 
in the process.  Participants from CEAA noted that industry is recognizing the need for a 
more regional approach, and they saw this as something that was working regarding the 
current approach to EA in the Beaufort region.  The same CEAA participants also noted 
that the offshore environment and regulatory EA system is less complex than the onshore 
environment in the NWT, noting that, with the federal government and the Inuvialuit 
Settlement Region being the only two lead players, there is much less complexity and 
tension between stakeholders.   
 
One proponent, from an Arctic oil and gas company, noted that there was good protection 
of the environment within the current approach.  A participant from the Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation raised the integrated regulatory approach as something that is 
working for environmental protection, noting well-integrated ecological approaches to 
scientific understanding of processes in the Beaufort.  Several participants stated that the 
current approach to EA in the Beaufort is working just fine, and that the organization and 
structure and the legislation that supports it are effective.  
 
4.1.1 Challenges to the efficacy of EA 
 
Participants identified several challenges to the current approach to EA and regulation for 
offshore oil and gas in the Beaufort region.  Most apparent was the range of responses, 
including challenges specific to the practice of EA, uncertainty and efficiency of the EA 
process, duplication and coordination, capacity to implement EA, and regulatory 
programs.  Each of these is addressed below.   
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4.1.1.1 Challenges specific to the practice of EA 
A common challenge concerned data to support EA in the study area.  One participant 
noted the lack of data in general, stating, “data is a huge issue, we don’t have a lot of it up 
here” (Government, DFO).  Most other participants, however, thought that there was 
considerable data on the study area, but there were concerns about data reliability, 
accessibility, and coordination to support EA efforts.  For example, one participant from 
the federal government commented on the shelf life of data collected in the study area, 
stating that “this lack of memory, this lack of ability to do an analysis, find it again, and 
believe it, and use it, is almost totally absent; …when they find it again, they say...well, 
nobody's around who did this, and the communities aren’t going to believe it, they 
weren’t involved” (Government, NEB).   
 
Inuvialuit boards and agencies expressed concerns about accessibility and coordination of 
data in the study area.  As noted by one participant, “one of the issues is that there is 
really no repository of data…no one organization that is taking data from historical things 
that have been done, and present things, and putting them all together.”  Participants from 
ENGOs agreed.  One participant from the Joint Secretariat expressed concern over the 
lack of support for the latest data coordination effort in the region, the Beaufort Regional 
Environmental Assessment (BREA), received from federal government, noting that it 
“was a pretty significant opportunity to follow up on the recommendations that came out 
of BSStRPA, but unfortunately it got to the point where submission was made to charge 
the board, and it got turned down.”   
 
Another Joint Secretariat participant viewed the federal government as being responsible 
for ensuring that there is enough baseline data to make informed decisions on EAs.  This 
participant went on to express further concern that, if left to the proponents to collect the 
regional data for their EAs, it creates a very unpredictable regulatory EA process, 
“…then you have to wait until [the proponent’s] put in a development proposal, and then 
you have to assess that; …you may have potential for a major impact on lake trout 
populations, or whatever, but you haven’t got enough baseline data.”  This can put the 
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government in a difficult position when assessing EAs that cost proponents significant 
amounts of money, by allowing the proponents to explore the development area, such as 
a lease block, in the first place.  One ENGO participant spoke to this same issue, stating: 
 “…when oil and gas rights are issued, that is the first step of development.  
Companies are committed, they have either paid cash, or they have committed to 
a certain amount of work, and then its later in the stage that an EA is done, after 
the proponent has decided they want to go forward with the project, its later that 
the EA is conducted, but yet, in many ways, the project has already begun.  And it 
becomes hard for government to say no.”   
 
Closely related to the above, another common identified challenge specific to the EA 
process was the lack of a regional approach.  Currently the EA process does not 
adequately consider the political and regional environmental context within which 
development is being proposed.  All participant groups identified this as one of the main 
challenges to the current process.  A participant from INAC, for example, pointed out 
that “they [proponents] are not required or enforced to look at a regional 
perspective….there is a lack of regional perspective in the EA process.”  However, the 
participant went on to note that “this is a general issue, but is certainly evident in the 
Beaufort.”  A participant from one of the Arctic boards agreed, noting that project EAs 
don’t “fit within some kind of strategic context, I don’t think there is a thought-out 
process for that; it may be more reactive than integrated and proactive.”  A representative 
from one of the Arctic oil and gas companies in the region expressed this as a problem of 
scale in EA: 
“EAs are little microcosms, and they measure against what?  They measure 
against what was there the day before, and then the next one measures against 
what was there the day before, so if you look at it over time there could be 
significant change but each EA says, incrementally, were not doing anything 
different.  And I mean, that’s classically the challenge with EA vs. a broader SEA 
or REA.” (Industry, ConocoPhillips Canada) 
 
Due to this lack of a strategic approach within the current EA process, effectively 
addressing cumulative effects was also identified as a challenge.  Government, ENGOs 
and representatives from Inuvialuit boards and agencies all identified the problems of 
cumulative effects assessment, but, interestingly, industry representatives did not raise 
the issue specifically.  One member of an Inuvialuit co-management Board explained: 
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“…the majority of the people on the coast, including Tuktoyaktuk, still rely a lot 
on the land and the animals for subsistence.  And they do know that if a big 
project comes on-stream, no matter what you do, the cumulative effect is going to 
be huge, and it might not be that noticeable, but if you put everything together 
that has happened, then it becomes a bigger problem, even into the future.”  
Another participant from the North similarly expressed the challenge of cumulative 
effects, explaining: 
“If you look at the screening committee guidelines, I don’t think you would even see 
the word cumulative impacts.  If you look at the timing of the land claim, and the 
various organizations that came out of it, being 1985, and the development of sort of 
environmental assessment thoughts and practice.  It was at the beginning of those 
types of concepts, and so the broader based stuff didn’t get written directly into it.  
Not that that’s an excuse, but I think that’s kind of what’s happened.”  
A participant from the federal government simply noted that “cumulative effects are not 
effectively addressed” (Government, Parks Canada), while an ENGO participant argued 
that “usually cumulative effects management comes into place later on, after a project is 
proposed”, but that “cumulative effects of projects should be done way before the rights 
are issued, and it should be part of land use planning.”   
 
A final challenge that was raised specific to EA process regarded dated policies and 
legislation, but this was raised only by industry and ENGO participants. For example, one 
participant from industry raised concern over the same season relief well drilling policy 
existing currently in the study area, which must be included in EA design and application, 
noting that “the same season [relief well drilling] policy was developed and designed for 
shallow waters in the Beaufort… It simply cannot be applied to deep water.”  While deep 
water drilling policies concerned industry, an ENGO participant voiced concern over the 
way exploratory rights are issued in relation to EA, stating that “in other jurisdictions 
there is an EA that is conducted before the rights are issued, and you can call that an 
Strategic EA (SEA), or a pre-tenure plan, and in my mind that is exactly what needs to 
happen in this region…the first step of development.”   Currently, legislation in the study 
area considers a project in the development stage only once the EA has been approved.   
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4.1.1.2 Uncertainty and efficiency  
Participants from every group, with the exception of ENGOs, noted uncertainty, in some 
capacity, as a challenge to the current EA process. Some referred to uncertainties in 
relation to understanding of the EA and regulatory process itself; others, including a 
participant from the federal government, noted that the multitude of players involved in 
the current EA regulatory process in the study area adds to process uncertainty – 
specifically the size of federal EA hearing panels and the need for fewer players at the 
table.   
 
Many issues of uncertainty, however, were largely exogenous to the EA and regulatory 
system.  For industry, for example, the volatile economic environment in the Beaufort 
region and within Canada in general, was identified as a main challenge to the EA 
process.  As a participant from CAPP explained, “…it doesn’t take a big swing in the 
economy to make a huge shift in the economics of a project up in the north, because its 
remote, particularly offshore.”    
 
Each group of participants also had a certain concern about efficiency that was not shared 
by participants as a whole.  For example, a federal government regulator noted that the 
lack of human capacity lengthens the amount of time it takes to appraise an EA, stating 
that “it takes a lot of time because, again it’s one project by one project and there’s only 
one of me.”  However, another government participant, from a different agency, stated 
that the timeline issues may have more to do with planning than with the project-by-
project review per se.  A participant from industry noted that they want the process to be 
shorter than it currently is, but they would be happy with just a guarantee that there is a 
maximum time that a project EA can take.  The participant challenged the efficacy of EA, 
stating: 
 “We need to stop and evaluate if they even work.  Is EA a tool that works 
anymore?  And I’m not saying that they don’t work, but I’m just challenging it.  
You prove to me that they do work.  The EAs that I have read, there are definitely 
aspects that need to be there, but the EA package now, I think it’s more about the 
package than it is about the benefit.  And so in the end, I would like somebody to 
look at some classical EAs and see how the assessment itself, and the work that 
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was done, changed the outcome of the approval or not approval…could you have 
done it without the EA?”  (Industry, ConocoPhillips Canada).   
 
Quite the opposite, another participant from the federal government expressed concern 
over efficiency in terms of current efforts to lessen the requirements of EA, stating that 
“what we see, I think, is the steady diminution if you like, or lessening of oversight or 
examination, and that’s more in the strict EA type of setting” (Government, CEAA).  An 
ENGO participant raised similar concerns, saying that EAs did not occur early enough in 
the process, and that exploration and seismic activities did not trigger EAs.  A participant 
from one of the Inuvialuit boards and agencies also addressed this timing issue, noting 
that “they [federal government] don’t give enough leeway time; its ‘right-now’ type of 
thing, we barley have enough time to sit down and go over all of them to make any 
comments as an HTC, or as a community.”  This frustration about efficiency in EA was 
also relayed by another participant from one of the Inuvialuit boards, saying the matter is 
“…just a lack of preparedness to handle any kind of oil issue in the Beaufort Sea.”   
 
4.1.1.3 Duplication and coordination 
Another challenge identified by most participants concerned overlap and duplication of 
EA related efforts and processes.  Industry specifically addressed concerns about 
duplicative EA systems, noting that they tried to work together when both IFA and 
CEAA processes “bumped up” from a screening-level EA, but that greater clarity was 
needed around each of the two processes.  For example, one industry participant stated 
that “the overlap is definitely an issue; …you’ve got the IFA process and the CEAA 
processes, which have sort of worked together but…I think there could be greater 
clarity.”  Participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies tended to agree that there 
was duplication built into the current EA process, but seemed to accept this as a challenge 
that the system would always have, hinting that the Inuvialuit boards and agencies are 
less willing to consider changes to the current process.  For example, one participant 
noted that there always has been overlap between regulatory agencies, and that “…you’re 
going to suffer some of the consequences of that any time you bring in multiple levels of 
government...”    
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ENGOs and government participants also identified duplication in the CEAA and ISR 
EA process, with one participant from the government of the NWT noting that anything 
offshore is duplicative, getting an automatic CEAA assessment, similar to a 
comprehensive study EA.  The participant explained that this process was separate from 
that of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR), and in the ISR there is an environmental 
impact review board that examines the exact same proposal. In sharp contrast, however, 
one federal participant argued that the issue is not so much duplication as it is a lack of 
understanding of the difference between the two systems:  
“In terms of overlap and duplication, people tend to complain about that a lot, but 
I think there is a lack of understanding that the two main processes that take place 
here, we have CEAA and the Environmental Impact Screening Committee (EISC) 
which is the co-management body.  They are based on two completely different 
value systems.  So the EISC looks at wildlife enhancement, Inuvialuit way of life, 
at the different value systems; whereas CEAA looks at significant environmental 
effects.  So even though they are two parallel processes, sometimes they are 
happening at the very same time, were pretty much doing the same assessment of 
them, but just based on different values, and I find myself explaining that a lot, 
even to people within, regulators.”  
 
4.1.1.4 Capacity 
A final challenge identified concerning current EA and offshore oil and gas regulation in 
the Beaufort concerned capacity. Several participants addressed high staff turnover, 
which they felt lead to a lack of consistency in EA decisions made.  One representative of 
the NEB, for example, explained that “the players, staff turnover…this lack of memory, 
this lack of ability to do an analysis, find it again, and believe it, and use it, is almost 
totally absent.”  A participant from one of the Inuvialuit co-management boards agreed, 
stating that two year election periods on Hunters and Trappers Committee’s (HTC) 
boards was a challenge, because “if these guys were there for two years, they caught on 
and got involved with something, but then their two years are up…then it has to start all 
over.”  Financial capacity was also a concern, identified by a participant from one of the 
Inuvialuit co-management boards as the number one challenge, questioning who was 
going to supply financing for future EAs that seem inevitable in the Beaufort region.  
Another participant from federal government raised the capacity challenge with regard to 
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impact mitigation efforts in EA, particularly the limited emergency response capacity in 
the region.  
 
 
4.1.2 Challenges unique to the efficacy of EA offshore 
 
Participants were almost equally divided as to whether the challenges raised regarding the 
current EA process were unique to the offshore environment. The majority of participants 
from government agreed that the challenges were not unique to offshore, while industry, 
ENGOs, and participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies were divided on the 
issue.  Those participants who said that the challenges were not unique to the offshore 
environment noted that having the settled land claims in the offshore region helped frame 
the roles and responsibilities for the various stakeholders.  For example, one federal 
government regulator stated that “we have the benefit of having settled land claims, so 
that helps to frame the roles and responsibilities.”  
 
Participants who thought that the challenges were unique to the offshore environment 
pointed to technical and regulatory issues. Technical challenges raised included the deep-
water environment and the unknowns that face oil and gas initiatives, including a lack of 
data. One ENGO participant commented that “the environmental risks are that much 
higher when you are working in water.”  A participant from the Joint Secretariat stated 
that “the issue simply is the fact that there is such a lack of data on really what’s 
happening in the offshore.”   
 
The complex political environment was also noted, as well as the fact that there has been 
little development thus far in the Beaufort short of seismic exploration, and exploratory 
drilling in the 1970’s and 1980’s.  One ENGO participant thought that the offshore 
environment is “a bit simpler because there’s not as many [interests involved], the 
jurisdiction is a bit less complex than it can be in an onshore environment.”  The same 
participant went on to explain that there were few sectors to deal with offshore, as well as 
a clear federal jurisdiction.  However, a participant from one of the Inuvialuit boards 
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disagreed, stating “there is more regulatory understanding for the onshore…but I think 
there is more ambiguity and jurisdictional difficulty.”  Another participant from one of 
the Inuvialuit co-management boards agreed, stating: 
 “In the offshore, it gets a lot more fuzzy. Depending on the nature of what you’re 
talking about may affect who the players are at the table, who you need to have 
discussions with.  So, I would say that the offshore challenges are greater than the 
onshore - both in terms of jurisdiction as well as the logistics and technical 
aspects of drilling and production.”   
As a participant from industry nicely explained 
“as soon as you put your toes into the water, everything goes up about 100 fold - 
cost, effort, time, and it’s got a lot to do with just logistics, it has a lot to do with 
safety, it has a lot to do with weather; doing work offshore is certainly an order of 
magnitude more complex than say the Delta.”  
 
4.2 Participant Knowledge of and Expectations of Regional and Strategic EA 
 
Participants were asked to discuss their understanding of regional and strategic EA, 
including the potential advantages to a more regional or strategic approach to EA in the 
Beaufort Sea, and what such a process might deliver and to whom.  There was 
considerable variation in participant’s understanding of the nature and role of regional 
and strategic EA. As one participant from the federal government said, “no one knows 
what REA or SEA is; there is no common definition, there is no common legislated 
requirement for it, there is no certainty as to the benefits that it might bring.” A 
participant from industry noted the need to “distinguish or draw some definitions around 
regional or strategic because in terms of what an ‘EA plus’ could deliver, there are all 
types of things…, and I think that’s where some of the current confusion lies.”  Various 
participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies identified their own lack of 
understanding as a challenge, with one participant noting that “if you asked me to define 
SEA, I wouldn’t be sure of what it was.” Collectively, however, two distinct schools of 
thought emerged from the results: those who perceived regional and strategic EA as one 
of the same, and those who perceived regional EA and strategic EA to be two very 
different approaches. 
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4.2.1. Regional and strategic EA viewed as ‘the same thing’ 
 
Slightly more than half of participants did not distinguish between a regional and 
strategic EA, answering questions about the potential for a broader approach to EA with 
no separation, with many addressing the approach as Regional Strategic Environmental 
Assessment or ‘R-SEA’.  Participants of this view included all groups (i.e., government, 
ENGOs, industry, Inuvialuit boards and agencies), but the majority were from Inuvialuit 
boards and agencies with the minority from government, industry, and ENGOs. There 
were some government participants who made a slight distinction between regional EA 
and strategic EA, but then backtracked and stated that they used both terms in the same 
way.  For example, one participant stated: “I see clear advantages to a regional or 
strategic approach, by which we mean greater than project by project, and I use those 
terms interchangeably.” The participant went on to explain, “when I look at definitions of 
regional and strategic they seem like the same thing to me, except for the Cabinet 
Directive, which seems a bit different.”  This was similar to another federal government 
participant, but from a different agency, who also recognized the Cabinet Directive and 
its connection to SEA, but at the same time said “let’s just talk about SEA and REA in 
the same breath.”   
 
When asked to describe what they saw as the fundamental purpose of and advantages to a 
regional and strategic EA approach, many suggested that R-SEA would provide increased 
certainty or clarity to the regulatory system in the Beaufort Sea.  For example, one federal 
regulator noted that “it would provide clarity to the industry, which they always are 
seeking.” Industry participants tended to agree, with one adding that “I think it has to 
deliver benefits to all three of those groups.  So I think it has to deliver to the Inuvialuit 
and local people, it has to deliver some confidence.”   
 
All participant groups viewed R-SEA as something that should help identify data gaps, as 
well as provide a means to establish a regional database.  For example, one government 
regulator noted that “we could identify the environmental impacts before hand, identify 
our information gaps, and start to work to fill some of those…for the regulators, and 
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managers, to assist in making those decisions.”  An industry participant spoke to what 
proponents in the study area expect of R-SEA, noting that “we want the baseline data, 
you want to have the information, you want to have the feedback and information from 
stakeholders so that you can plan and see what’s going on.” A participant from an ENGO 
agreed, stating that “ideally, it would also allow us to get our data in order too.”  A few 
participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies viewed R-SEA as delivering a 
regional database.  For example, one participant noted: 
 “From a strategic and regional perspective, understanding baseline conditions and 
identifying indicators to monitor are crucial; we don’t have that, we don’t 
understand ecological processes from an ecosystem perspective…we don’t know 
how to define what healthy ecosystem function is, so we don’t know which 
variations and which indicators might point you in the direction that an activity 
was having a significant and irreversible impact.”  
The most agreed upon purpose of R-SEA in the Beaufort was that of developing a 
regional vision and a future plan for the offshore region.  For example, as one federal 
regulator explained: 
“You get a regional perspective, another fundamental purpose is that you develop 
a regional plan for the area, so there’s a vision moving forward in terms of how 
much development is acceptable, where such development is acceptable, and this 
is the result of the analysis at ideally an early stage of development, where you 
can actually say, you know, ok, this is where we are going to start to get 
concerned in terms of our, if we start detecting effects, at this level of effects we 
are going to start to get concerned, so that’s established early on.  That’s sort of 
that plan for when do you start to take notice of things going wrong, and you 
develop a plan for watching for these effects.” (Government, INAC).  
 
An ENGO participant echoed this sentiment, noting that “the benefits are that you can 
essentially establish a vision…and then you can track against that and monitor to see 
whether you are going where people want to go.”  This idea of a regional vision was 
thought by participants to help establish appropriate development levels, as noted by one 
Inuvialuit board and agency participant, who expressed that you could then evaluate 
different levels of development from a strategic perspective, and “...say ok, here is what 
the likely results will be of 2 wells, 10 wells, 50 wells, and then go to the people that live 
here, and say where is your level of acceptance.” Participants from the Joint Secretariat, 
as well as the Inuvialuit Game Council, also saw benefits to R-SEA in establishing such a 
regional vision.  For example, one participant stated that “you get the bigger picture view 
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of things, and can do planning and assessment on the ecosystem scale.” The participant 
went on to explain that “when you constrain the scope of the assessment, it causes 
difficulties because…it [an impact] may happen in that one location but the impacts may 
be felt in a much broader area.”   
 
In this regard, some participants saw an R-SEA as a means to narrow a project EA by 
dealing with common regional issues upfront.  For example, one federal participant noted 
that “you want to do your generic up front stuff, identify and solve the big problems, 
that’s what…regional EAs all about…get those out of the way.”  An industry proponent 
agreed with this sentiment, stating that: 
“It will, if it’s done right, facilitate a more focused EA, and an EA that can be 
carved out to address the key issues.  So instead of doing 80% of the information 
gathering that may be unnecessary for an application process, it’s data for data 
sake, we don’t want to pay for that.  What, instead, we would like to see, is, ok, 
‘here are the three big things that came out of a regional plan…. And then you 
kind of go, ok, instead of doing this broad EA, now we know what the issues are, 
were going to put 80% of our effort towards those three things, and then the other 
stuff we will handle as it comes up….The EAs go from large to smaller, but they 
are fitted into a scale that is large.”  
 
Participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies saw this as fundamental to R-SEA, 
with one participant noting that it should be “trying to gather as much info from the broad 
scale as possible, and trying to answer some of those key questions that may be required 
as part of the project specific EA,” and “because there are some overarching issues and 
questions that every project has to answer…they don’t need to keep repeating the same 
thing over and over again.”  In adopting such an approach, an R-SEA was seen as having 
the potential to help regulators establish ‘no-development’ zones, in that “if you manage 
things in a larger holistic kind of framework then you can possibly identify areas where 
you can absolutely say no.” Added to this, several government participants saw potential 
for R-SEA to contribute to adaptive management, which incorporates new information as 
it is obtained to best inform environmental management decisions, moving the EA 
process  from a linear process into a cyclical adaptive process.  One government 
participant explained that “if your understanding of effects starts to change…, or if the 
detection of effects happens sooner or later than you had anticipated, you can alter your 
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plan accordingly.”   
 
Participants also viewed R-SEA as a tool to help facilitate increased consultation and 
allow for better stakeholder communication.  Industry, for example, emphasized R-SEA 
as delivering a multi-stakeholder process whereby “everybody benefits… there is no 
drawback.” One federal participant similarly noted that “in the end, even the fact that you 
have the appropriate people in a room talking about things is helpful.”  Another added 
that “its fundamental purpose would be to include as much local involvement as possible, 
..taking into account… traditional knowledge that has been observed from people who 
have resided in this area for their entire life.”   
 
4.2.2 Regional and strategic EA viewed as separate processes – SEA and REA 
 
Slightly less than half of the participants considered regional and strategic EA as separate 
but sequential approaches.  Participants with this view were from government, ENGOs, 
industry, and Inuvialuit boards and agencies. The majority were from government and 
industry.  Those who viewed regional and strategic EA as separate often referred to the 
federal Cabinet Directive on SEA, indicating that that they viewed strategic EA primarily 
as a regulatory process.  For example, one government participant explained that “the 
[definition] that’s closest to our mandate is one that is pursuant to the Cabinet Directive 
in terms of undertaking a strategic EA to inform a policy decision, and in our case the 
policy decision is one around issuing rights in …the Beaufort.”  An industry participant 
similarly made the connection with the Cabinet Directive, stating that SEA was 
fundamentally a government approach and that “one could argue whether there has ever 
been an SEA for the Canadian Beaufort.”  One ENGO participant also identified SEA as 
specific to government agencies, that “the idea is that government agencies conduct EAs 
of their own programs and policies.”   
 
Almost all participants who identified regional and strategic EA as separate processes 
said that an SEA should deal with policy decisions.  One government participant referred 
to the case of same season relief well drilling in the Beaufort, explaining “we were 
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attempting to deal with that issue in more of a policy framework outside of an individual 
project - …why is this policy here, what are its merits, what are alternatives…”  An 
industry participant agreed, noting that an SEA is designed to make decisions on policy 
matters, noting, as an example, that “since INAC made a conscience decision a few years 
ago to start issuing calls for nominations for deep water, I can only assume that 
somewhere in that organization that they made a policy decision that they wanted to go 
further offshore.” Another industry participant further explained: 
“I think strategic EA is more of a policy-type approach; it’s about the 
consideration of options and the identification of a path forward; it’s about 
identifying your strategy - what are the options we want to pursue. Do we want to 
pursue oil and gas development, do we want to pursue more of an onshore thing, 
do we want to pursue uranium mining… But you can consider these options and 
identify the issues and so, and I think you can do that at different levels.” 
The same industry participant went on to explain that, in terms of SEA, even if the policy 
decision was that there should be ‘no development’, there would be frustration but no 
money lost. The participant explained that in an area where the government is not 
currently issuing leases you could do an SEA and there would be no real loss to industry 
at that point if the decision remains unchanged, and if they do identify areas for lease 
issuance “then you are better informed going in”.  Once rights have been issued, “you can 
make the decisions you need to make about your land base, but you are going to have to 
address compensation for existing rights holders if you are affecting their right.”  In this 
same context, another industry participant expressed frustration with the timing issue of 
SEA, arguing that when a company is issued an exploration well in the offshore they drill 
because they expect that they are going to discover a commercial quantity of oil and or 
gas and move into development.  The participant argued that this is not the time to do a 
SEA, “it’s a little bit late.”    
 
Some participants from the Inuvialuit boards  and agencies also viewed SEA as 
something connected largely to policy decisions, and a process best suited to issues such 
as spill regulations, same season relief wells, best practices, standards and regulations.  
Similarly, an EGNO participant identified SEA as means to address broader issues such 
as rights issuance, noting that SEAs should “look at all of the rights that they are planning 
to issue in a particular area, and say, is this appropriate?  If we issue them all at once, 
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what would be the impact, if we issue them on a timed basis, or do we have limits on the 
amount we should issue, that kind of thing.”   A Inuvialuit board and agency participant 
echoed this sentiment, noting: 
 “INAC wanted to do something for leases, so they opened up a whole track of the 
Beaufort Sea for the bidding process, but what they needed there, before they 
started that, was strategically what would we like to reduce, and generally what is 
the possible conditions that we would release.  So to me that’s only a slice of the 
strategic policy issue with the Beaufort Sea, and I mentioned one before, OK, 
what are the limits of development, what can the whole Beaufort Sea sustained.”     
 
Many participants from the federal government described SEA as a higher-order process 
that could provide scope for REA baseline data collection.  Interestingly, though, one 
participant, also from the federal government, described an SEA in terms of using 
information collected from the REA.  This participant explained that “when an SEA 
would come in and look at something like oil and gas development in the offshore, or a 
new policy that would come in…I would use the REA as the baseline for my SEA.” This 
was contradictory to most participants who thought that SEA should be the first layer of 
the EA process. As one industry participant explained, “let’s start with SEA because 
that’s what I think should proceed REA in some sense.”    
 
For most participants, then, REA was understood as a tool to provide a regional vision 
and a plan for the future of the Beaufort offshore area.  For example, one federal 
government participant noted that an REA should be “more of like a long term look at a 
region.”  All participants who viewed SEA and REA as distinct processes agreed that an 
REA should not be addressing policy-type decisions.  As one government participant put 
it, an “REA doesn’t assess things in terms of how one policy or one type of development 
would affect it.”  An industry participant echoed this, noting that when they were 
working on BREA, which they considered an REA, “it was very much a regional 
exercise, it was not a strategic, it was not about the consideration of options.”  That said, 
one ENGO participant expressed that, though separate, REA should have policy backing, 
stating that: 
 “It has to have really clear policy connections from government as to what their 
accountability is, and how they are going to implement the plan, and that’s one of 
the risks I see with the approach in the Beaufort.  So I would like to see that with 
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the regional assessment in the Beaufort, that it be connected to the government 
coming out with a policy statement on environment management in that region, 
and that, so that’s a regional assessment.”     
 
Further, most participants understood REA as a process that would focus on the 
collection of regional baseline data.  For example, one government participant saw an 
REA as “having a better correlation of baseline data on a regional level.”  Another 
government participant agreed, stating that “it’s basically a baseline look, so that you 
have that, when something does come in and affect it.” Some industry participants 
similarly viewed REA as something that could help regulators make decisions once the 
baseline data were more complete.  For example, one industry participant noted that “the 
REA could help if in fact the regulators in particular were able to reach a conclusion that 
there is a sufficient data base to allow them to make informed decisions on applications 
that come in” and “if and when we put an application in, we would just pull that decision 
off the shelf, put it into our application, and say ‘there’.”  Another industry participant 
was more concerned about how REA would help with monitoring, stating that 
“depending on how it is designed, if it’s, in fact, more of an ongoing monitoring 
requirement, that may alleviate certain post-project monitoring requirements, because this 
is all about cost efficiencies; governments can't do this all on their own, and they don’t.” 
The participant went on to explain that if conceptualized as an on-going monitoring 
program for regional environments, to which companies redirect some of their own 
resources in support, REA could “have a real meaningful output for everyone.”     
 
4.2.3 Participants’ understanding of other participant’s views of regional and 
strategic EA 
 
One question posed to participants was whether they saw any consensus about the nature 
and role of regional and strategic EA in the Beaufort Region.  There were only a couple 
of participants from government who saw a general consensus, one of which drew on the 
recent BREA experience and noted, “I don’t think everyone was on a different 
page….industry was at the table during the development of BREA; there was buy in from 
government and industry.”  The majority of participants, however, acknowledged that 
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there is little agreement and a lack of understanding regarding regional and strategic 
approaches to EA amongst the group of interested stakeholders of oil and gas initiatives 
in the Beaufort region.   
 
One federal government participant noted “there is varying opinions on what a regional 
EA and a strategic EA could be,” and others commented that the Inuvialuit communities 
do not seem to be aware of what regional and strategic EA mean; though, another federal 
participant stated that “the Inuvialuit were certainly the most supportive of this initiative 
[BREA].”  A number of government participants thought that industry was primarily 
looking for certainty in the EA process, and that there was concern regarding the addition 
of another step, such as regional and strategic EA, with one participant noting that “the 
last thing they [industry] want is for additional complexity to be added…they are really 
concerned that this would slow them down” (Government, INAC).  
 
A participant from industry identified confusion at the federal level within government 
itself, stating that “at a table in Ottawa, within the federal family, there continues to be a 
large amount of confusion…throwing around terms like R-SEA, REA, SEA, place-based 
approaches to resource management.” The participant went on to question whether they 
were different and “how would you use one in one context and another in 
another…people are really getting hung up on the terminology and failing to fully 
identify what they might see as needs and objectives for a process.”  ENGOs were also 
not seen by industry as being on the same page, with one participant noting that “when it 
comes to the environmental groups, they are all over the board.” From the industry 
perspective, participants cautioned that “everybody sees it differently right now,” that it 
was important to get “tight definitions around an REA, SEA”, and that when the BREA 
initiative was started “a lot of people envisioned it as a strategic one, so you need to be 
clear about what it is and what it isn’t, and if it’s going to deliver for you or not.” An 
ENGO participant summed up the ENGO groups thoughts concisely, stating that “there is 
considerable confusion around what R-SEA is and isn’t, and how it’s different from 
REA, and frankly from how it’s different from just creating data portals.”  
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The Inuvialuit boards and agencies echoed the above statements, noting that within the 
group of interested stakeholders “they are not coming at it in the same way.”   Opinions 
on what industry was looking for included certainty, as well as some concern over 
regional or strategic EA adding another level of bureaucracy.  Participants mentioned that 
the Inuvialuit communities want to ensure that any regional or strategic process is not 
“seen as sort of a broad brush pre-approval of projects in the Beaufort, and allowing them 
to be exempted from the screening process,” but rather providing some environmental 
clarity over what the carrying capacity is for development.  Finally, some participants 
thought that the federal government was concerned that a regional EA approach would 
result in diminished federal roles and responsibilities, with one participant stating that 
“the concern that I thought that I saw coming from [government] was that they didn’t 
want to see their jurisdictional responsibilities taken away…they are very protective of 
their responsibilities.”   
 
4.3 Potential Value-added of Regional and Strategic EA to Offshore Oil and Gas 
Planning and Development  
 
Notwithstanding the diversity of understandings and interpretations of regional and 
strategic EA, and whether they are interpreted as an integrative or separate and sequential 
process, several agreed-upon benefits to regional and strategic EA offshore in the 
Beaufort Sea could be distilled from the interview results.  Participants discussed these 
benefits, or ‘value-add’, of R-SEA to include: identifying data gaps and constructing 
regional baselines, improving regulatory decision making, better planning for 
development in the Beaufort Region, greater certainty to stakeholders, managing 
cumulative effects, improved clarity of the EA process and expectations, improved 
communication and local involvement, and more meaningful project-based EA.   
 
4.3.1 Identifying data gaps and constructing regional baselines 
 
Overall, participants noted that a more regional and strategic approach to EA could help 
to identify data gaps and work towards creating a regional baseline.  For example, one 
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federal government participant thought that “we could identify the environmental impacts 
before hand, identify our information gaps, and start to work to fill some of those, which 
will ultimately, again, this is for the regulators and managers, assist in making those 
decisions.”  Another government participant agreed, stating that “it could provide clarity 
to everyone if there is that basic background science for you to base your EA, and 
planning on.” Inuvialuit boards and agency participants agreed that R-SEA could help 
with decision making, stating that “you can also get into the more technical aspects, 
which could be beneficial to the regulators, who need to know that info as well when they 
are doing their assessments of project applications.”   
 
One industry participant explained that one area of uncertainty in the region concerning 
development applications is “…have we collected enough baseline data, is it the right 
data.” Using northern wolf fish as an example, a rare species in the Beaufort Sea, the 
participant explained that when an EA application is submitted for review somebody will 
say that not enough data on wolf fish has been collected. “How much data is needed to 
make a judgment on an environmental assessment - that is one of the questions that we 
are always faced with.” A more regional EA would have potential to resolve these 
challenges “because that way, perhaps DFO, whoever else, could come back and say, we 
believe for the purposes of drilling in the offshore Beaufort that there is sufficient 
information on benthic fisheries to allow us to make some informed decisions on what 
the impact of a drilling program could be.” 
   
4.3.2 Improved regulatory decision making 
 
There was general consensus that regional and strategic EA could lead to improved 
regulatory-based decision making. Industry participants stated that “the regulators, 
generally, they want to have responsible development, so what they need to know is the 
environmental background, the risk, how the other stakeholders feel about it, and the 
confidence that they can stand up and say ‘this is being done right.” The key message 
was that regional and strategic EA would allow regulators to conduct more effective 
planning for offshore oil and gas exploration and development the Beaufort region.   
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The Inuvialuit agencies tended to agree, with one participant stating that “you would have 
something to evaluate against: it would help the ones responsible for EA and regional 
planning better design smart regulations to get the predicted outcome.”  Another 
participant from one of the co-management boards said that regional and strategic EA 
would allow regulators to say ‘no’, and that “when you have regional multi-party 
frameworks that are all saying the same things it makes the regulator's job very easy.” 
The participant explained that “regulators aren't terribly effective when they are isolated - 
land  and water planners in one corner, …fish in the other corner, …wildlife over on the 
center, and they are all making their independent decisions” The result of R-SEA is the 
ability for governments to identify and support ‘no-development’ zones.  As one 
Inuvialuit co-management board member put it:  
“The value added of looking at regional processes is that we are able to determine 
when we want to save something.  Like you could, in its entirety, say we don't 
want anything to happen to the Husky lakes area of the ISR.  We want to make it 
a ‘no go’ zone for development, for resource extraction and that some 
resemblance of that cultural and social value can be retained…Regulators want 
the ability to say no, so they need some type of support.”   
 
4.3.3 Better planning for development in the Beaufort 
 
Closely related to the above, participants recognized a more regional and strategic 
approach as something that would allow for better development planning in the Beaufort 
Region.  A regional vision and future plan for the study area was seen as a value-add by 
all groups but the Inuvialuit boards and agencies.  For example, one government 
participant noted that “you have a better chance of looking at the entire environment, so 
you are not looking at only the footprint of a project, but you’re looking at the greater 
footprint of multiple projects in a region, such as the Beaufort Sea”  (Government, 
INAC).  Another government participant thought that it would help avoid legal 
challenges, stating that “we can maybe get some hint or evidence that a project is going 
to lead to a certain pattern of land use development or economic effects, or opportunities, 
or impacts, and its not federal business” and for the federal government “to actually turn 
a project down because we think at some point a land use planning process hasn’t been 
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good enough, will lead to an overturn of our decision because it’s not our business” 
(Government, NEB).  On the similar subject of agreements, one government participant 
thought that R-SEA could “hold people to the consultations that they have had…so that 
minds couldn’t be changed as easily saying, ‘this is what was said for the REA, this is 
what we came up with as a group, this is what we have all agreed to” (Government, 
DFO).  An industry participant saw it as providing “a better understanding of the regional 
setting,” while an ENGO participant discussed the idea of a vision, stating: 
 “We believe that properly done means an R-SEA needs to consider future 
scenarios, and develop alternatives based upon future scenarios, alternatives that 
then inform current decisions.  The benefits are, that you can essentially establish 
a vision, economic, socio-cultural, and environmental, and you can lay down what 
your preferred vision for a landscape, or seascape is, and then you can track 
against that and monitor to see whether you are going where people want to go.”  
 
4.3.4 Greater certainty to stakeholders 
 
Almost all participants identified the potential value of regional and strategic EA in 
providing greater certainty to industry and stakeholders, with one participant stating that 
industry “would like to know if at some point [the regulators] are going to say no more, 
and I’m sure they would like to know if that number is…because they won’t spend 
money on something that they don’t think they are going to be able to do at the end of the 
day.”  Another participant agreed, stating that industry needs to “know that this is what 
the economic environment and the political and bureaucratic environment is going to be 
like.” When industry moves into the Beaufort Region they need to know, in advance, the 
obstacles and challenges that they are going to have to deal with in terms of regional 
plans, data, coordination, and consultation. One ENGO participant noted that R-SEA 
should manage risk, explaining that the industry typically wants to have an assured 
supply of a resource, but in order to manage the risk around ensuring that future supply 
“they need to determine, will we or will we not have the social licence to drill in the 
offshore in a particular area.”  Industry added to this list that R-SEA should deliver 
“tighter timelines, a more focused EA, and a better understanding of the regional setting.”  
 
Both industry and government participants commented on what they saw REA and SEA 
  61 
delivering to industry, which included increased clarity and a reduction of regional issues 
that would need to be addressed in a project EA.  For example, one federal government 
participant thought that “the proponents would be a lot happier if they had a better idea 
what’s expected of them” (Government, DFO).  Another noted that “proponents perhaps, 
in particular, are looking for some assurance that if you’ve delisted exploration wells 
from the comprehensive study list, and [they]…make the investment in an environmental 
study, …this isn’t going to get bumped to a full scale panel review at some point in time” 
(Government, CEAA).  Participants from the industry group agreed, and viewed R-SEA 
as providing such an opportunity to narrow the focus on project-based EA, thereby 
gaining greater efficiencies. For example, as stated by one participant:  
“If you look at what some of the regional approaches could deliver, I don’t think 
that’s a responsibility that should be downloaded onto proponents. And I don’t 
think it’s really, you know their responsibility should be to assess the effects of 
their project. I think that’s necessary...and a relevant and practical thing to ask 
them to do. But when you’re asking them to make broader judgments about 
significance and overall impacts on a region, I don’t think that’s something that 
you want to download to a proponent or fairly ask them to do.” (Industry, CAPP). 
This was echoed by another industry participant who explained that this would provide  
“value add to a proponent going in afterwards to say…I have to do my environmental 
mitigation, I have to be smart about what I am working…, but I now know that the issue 
of concern that I need to be focused on…, and this is where I need to focus my EA.”   
   
4.3.5 Managing cumulative effects 
 
Several participants thought that an R-SEA could help with assessing and mitigating 
cumulative effects.  For example, one government participant noted that an R-SEA “has 
potential to better evaluate cumulative effects” and “to better evaluate regional effects.” 
The participant explained that “effects that may be the result of an individual or several 
projects that aren’t necessarily detected within the footprint of those projects.” If, for 
example, marine mammals are stressed by development in a particular region and “then 
go off and have reproductive failure somewhere else, that is an effect that might not be 
detected in regular follow up from a project but something that might be better handled in 
a regional EA type of approach” (Government, INAC). Another federal government 
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participant explained that with the current regulatory system it is challenging to satisfy 
cumulative effects analysis “…because land use is set by the province or the land claim 
organizations, and our Act and our legislation requires us to assess a project” 
(Government, NEB).  A participant from industry suggested that under R-SEA “you 
could consider cumulative effects, or really multiple projects going on at the same time, 
or same time frame, which I think is certainly…a limitation of the current system”  
(Industry, CAPP). Another stated that “the cumulative effects starts to fit in, and the 
regional approach as well, because now you are looking, again at the regions sort of more 
holistically, and getting a sense of sort of how various pieces interconnect, more so than 
you would through an individual EA.” 
 
4.3.6 Clarity of process and expectations 
 
Participants thought that an R-SEA should be delivering clarity to all stakeholders. For 
example, one participant explained that R-SEA should provide clarity on whether a 
particular kind of resource development is appropriate for a given region, so such issues 
do not have to be repeatedly addressed for every individual action.  The participant raised 
the example of seismic operations, explaining that for every individual seismic project 
there are people saying “…we don’t think there should be oil and gas development in the 
North; if you have a process that asks people what they think, then they are going to tell 
you what they think”. The participant went on to explain that these sorts of broad issues 
should be addressed “in a regional one-time thing, and then not have that part of the 
public engagement on the project level, because the project level is for a different kind of 
question...regional or strategic EA should deal with that kind of question, clarity on the 
big questions” (Government, NEB).  Another federal participant agreed, stating that “the 
value added to the industry and communities, and regulators…it could provide clarity to 
everyone.” Participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies also raised the potential 
for R-SEA to bring clarity to stakeholders, noting that “everybody would know the rules, 
and what is expected.” The participant explained the situation as follows: 
“Right now, the HTCs are fighting to have wildlife monitors as mandatory, but 
people are just doing it, industry is doing it out of safety precautions, and stuff 
like that.  But research, always, they don’t have the budget to do that, so what 
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they are trying to work on is trying to get something in place, so say that was on 
there, everybody knows you need to have that.  So then that would benefit 
everybody because nobody would be fumbling around, saying, oh, you don’t need 
this, oh, you don’t need that, kind of flip flopping around.  And to deliver it, it 
would be to everybody, even the people in the town, so that they know, and are 
aware, clarity to them, to industry, to government, it would be good for 
everybody” (Inuvialuit Joint Secretariat).  
 
As other members from the Inuvialuit Boards and Agencies commented, “everybody 
would know the rules, and what is expected” and this would be of benefit to industry 
because “all they ever want is assurance…if they know what is yes and what it means, 
and what is no and what it means, they are happy because they have been told no many 
times but no one can really define it, and in the end it becomes yes.”  One member from a 
Inuvialuit co-management board explained further that  “…we really want them to want 
it because we need it economically to feed our own engines, so the surety is the biggest 
value we can bring to it”  Put another way, from the industry perspective, R-SEA was 
viewed as providing an opportunity to  “remove the redundancy, and also, ideally through 
doing that, your shortening your timelines for review because you are focusing in on the 
issues of concern and of relevance.” In the Beaufort Region, this notion of streamlining 
was “a huge driver behind the support that we [industry] had for the BREA exercise, [it] 
was about reducing the timelines for the subsequent project EAs.” As one industry 
participant explained, “it gets less costly in terms of going through the application 
process; there may be…magnitudes of scale, efficiencies, where you may be able to 
reduce costs for a better outcome at the end of the day.”  
 
4.3.7 Improved communication and local involvement 
 
One participant from industry thought that a potential value-add from an R-SEA would 
be earlier consultation with local communities, explaining that the communities would 
have a better understanding of what is happening and have earlier input to the planning 
process because “when you get to an application process, as some players point out, you 
are already behind the 8 ball, somebody already has a plan.”  Participants also thought 
that a more regional and strategic approach to EA in the Beaufort Region should have 
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certain deliverables to local communities.  For example, one participant from a Inuvialuit 
agency thought that it should demonstrate how an offshore development “would benefit 
the people that live here, and the environment and the ecosystems that people depend 
on.”  Others from the North saw the communities gaining more communication through 
R-SEA, with one participant noting that “it comes back to them having access to a voice, 
to be able to maintain the livelihood that they see fit to maintain.”  Another participant 
agreed, stating that “it can narrow the focus down, it can make consultation with the 
communities much more focused…and in that sense…would have a lot of benefit to the 
communities because basically it provides them answers to questions if presented to them 
in a meaningful way.”  Industry expressed the same perspective, stating that “to 
communities, more information, better understanding on what’s going on, and an earlier 
input into the planning process” are key local benefits of R-SEA.  That said, one 
government participant noted that the local communities should be responsible for 
including themselves in the conversation and that “the community level involvement is 
something that I see as an Inuvialuit responsibility, and it’s up to them to determine how 
communities are engaged in the development of this plan moving forward…the venue of 
engagement needs to be through the co-management bodies.” 
 
Interestingly, one Inuvialuit board and agency participant disagreed with the idea of 
increased consultation and spoke instead of R-SEA as providing better consultation, 
stating:  
“If you can provide that broad scale answer that could be applied to all projects, 
they [proponents] don’t need to keep repeating the same thing over and over 
again, which causes a lot of strain on the companies that have to come, but also on 
the communities, because they have to come in, and answer the same questions 
over and over and over again.  And it’s very frustrating for them, because they 
have one company coming in and they have to ask a series of questions to apply 
to their project.  Then you have another company coming in and working in a 
similar area, and they have to ask the same questions again, because a lot of times 
they don’t want to share data with each other.  Its proprietary and they spent the 
money to collect it.  Their small towns and they are being consulted to death on 
everything. So in that sense you can take some of those broad, especially the 
ecosystem level questions, and that’s a lot of the things that the communities have 
concerns about, is those types of issues.  And they can basically narrow the focus 
of the project specific EA to the very specific things for that project area.  
Because all of those other questions, so the obligatory questions, they are all 
  65 
answered and dealt with through this larger process.”  
 
A number of federal government participants noted the importance of Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge (TEK), and suggested that local TEK would be best suited within 
a more regional EA platform.  A participant from industry agreed, noting that TEK might 
help within sensitive areas identification within the region, especially “if the aim is 
continuity in terms of time series data to support the management of a region that is of 
elevated importance, because the reality is I don't think you want this model 
everywhere.” The participant went on to explain that there may be certain areas where it 
is easy to delineate, [or] more important to folks for a whole number of reasons, maybe 
it’s a species hot spot in combination with traditional use.”   
 
4.3.8 Meaningful project-based EA 
 
The majority of participants thought that an R-SEA could help to narrow project EAs by 
addressing common regional issues upfront. For example, a government participant stated 
that “the driver is an individual project, but can we take a step back from this proposal 
and see…why is this policy here, what are its merits, what are alternatives.” In the 
absence of R-SEA, the participant explained that with a single project review “…those 
kinds of things…would tend to take over everything else…that would be the only thing 
that would be publically examined [but] questions about oil and ice and effects on 
mammals, and changing ice conditions and all of those other questions are still out there ” 
(Government, CEAA).  One government participant thought that the regional issues 
would be “taken care of in the R-SEA, and not have to be dealt with in the project EA,” 
such as cumulative effects and cumulative effects monitoring (Government, INAC).  
Another participant mentioned that if there are issues around regional processes, or 
regional scale variables that come up with each and every project, there would be 
opportunity through R-SEA to “collectively sort of address that almost as a class 
assessment approach”  (Government, CEAA).  Industry echoed this idea, with one 
participant the value added of R-SEA as follows: 
 “Here’s the region, how can we look at this region holistically, rather than on the 
individual project by project basis, and how can we, I guess sort of provide that 
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regional framework, the regional understanding, the regional framework that then, 
project proponents can sort of fill in with their individual project information. So I 
think if you look at that, certainly the original proposal, a huge driver behind it 
was eliminating the redundancy in the applications and in the information being 
collected in terms of…do we need to get the same information on the same area, 
more or less, six times over, or can we just collect it once for the region and be 
done with it, and then have individual project proponents supplement as 
necessary.  So I think the regional exercise is more about eliminating some of that 
redundancy, and just really getting the greatest bang for your buck for the 
individual project proponents” (Industry, CAPP).   
 
A Inuvialuit board and agency participant agreed, explaining that there are “things that 
are larger than a project specific, or things that would be relevant for all projects within 
the Beaufort Sea, …so you don’t repeat it in the EA processes every time.”  The 
participant further explained that R-SEA could “make it easier for them [industry] 
through a project specific EA process, because it wasn’t intended to replace them, and in 
addition it will tackle a number of very regional themes, socio-economic as an example, 
cumulative impact monitoring, …or terms and conditions.  Another participant from the 
Inuvialuit Joint Secretariat noted that “the value added is that you don’t have to keep on 
doing it [project-specific EA and related data collection] over and over again, at least not 
all of it.”    
 
Another perceived value-added of R-SEA identified by most participants was that it 
could lead to a more adaptive approach to EA.  Off-ramping regional issues from project 
EA to the more regional and strategic EAs was seen as a benefit, as well as the 
opportunity to inform project EAs and other land management processes.  For example, 
one government participant stated that “the project EA is going to inform your REA, and 
ultimately your REA, which is sort of over a longer term, is going to help you make 
decisions with project specific EA” (Government, DFO).  Closely related to this was the 
issue of monitoring, and the ability through regional approaches to bring project specific 
information back to the regional database.  Participants from industry saw the main 
benefit from a linked project EA-R-SEA as allowing a focusing of project EA 
requirements by off-ramping regional concerns to R-SEA.  One industry participant 
stated that “if you are doing your R-SEA right, what you are doing with an EA is you are 
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asking companies to focus on issues of concern…you are dealing with the repetitive 
routine stuff up ahead, and …we know the issues of concern on a regional basis.” That 
being said, concern was raised by one industry participant that the R-SEA should occur 
before projects, or the added process may lengthen project EA timelines.   
 
ENGO participants saw clear connections between project EAs and R-SEAs, explaining 
that “R-SEA provides the regional baseline and context for how EA decisions are 
actually made” and that “getting the desired future scenario established for an entire 
region creates the context by which singular EAs would be used to make decisions about 
whether or not a particular project contributes beneficially to the objectives laid out under 
that desired future scenario.” Participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies 
similarly identified the opportunity to set the regional context through “a living process” 
that is both “adaptive and forward thinking.” As one participant explained, for example, 
“you wouldn’t be able to judge an individual proposal unless you could put it into the 
perspective of the regional framework.” Another participant from the Inuvialuit Joint 
Secretariat agreed, stating that a more regional and strategic approach would benefit 
projects “because it answers some of those broad ecosystem based questions” and, in 
turn, project-specific EAs could benefit broader regional and strategic frameworks “by 
providing some of the more detailed info in a more narrow area, …a sense whether the 
broad based results are true or not, whether their actually valid.”  
 
4.4 Risks and Perceived ‘Value-lost’ of Regional and Strategic EA to Offshore Oil 
and Gas Planning and Development  
 
Notwithstanding the perceived benefits, there were concerns, however, that a R-SEA 
approach could lead to some value lost in the study area.  For example, participants raised 
concerns over potential limitations on development opportunities, the uncertainty of a 
novel approach, the risk of another regulatory layer, and reduced decision making 
flexibility.   
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4.4.1 Foregoing anticipated development opportunities 
 
A concern raised by a few participants was that an R-SEA could limit development in the 
study area.  For example, one federal government participant stated that “a value lost to 
this, if I were Industry, I might say limit on development.”  An industry participant 
viewed a potential problem if someone tried to use the R-SEA to stop development, 
stating that “some proponents would have the perception that there is a greater risk to 
their asset, and the planning of their asset, …so if you do something new like this and 
somebody tries to railroad the process, or somebody tries to get in there and use this as a 
lever to stop development; I think the key is to set some ground rules.”  Another industry 
participant agreed that R-SEA could increase risk to potential business.  When 
considering the future of R-SEA, this participant commented: “How is such an approach 
going to affect existing rights, or future opportunities…how does that impact us in any 
way right now?”  One ENGO participant identified a similar concern to industry, stating 
that “the risks to industry would be that if people think about future scenarios and realize 
the possible trade offs, risks coming from oil spills or accidents, or the implications for 
conservation, … some options for Industry could be foreclosed, either on how they drill 
or where they drill.”   
 
4.4.2 Uncertainties of a novel approach 
 
Some viewed R-SEA as something that could increase uncertainty in the offshore 
development region.  For example, one industry participant noted that “one of the 
downsides is the unknown with these R-SEAs; nobody, with the exception of Norway, no 
one has pulled these things off where everybody benefited in the way that they think they 
should.”   Another participant, a federal regulator, echoed this sentiment, stating that 
“with the uncertainty, yes, I think there could be [value lost] depending on the way you 
do it, …and if that question around how we are supposed to apply it isn’t clear then it 
could be of limited value.” This participant went on to explain that this wouldn’t 
necessarily mean “…a total loss, because there would be that background science that we 
could use to help us base our decisions on, but the clarity that some might seek wouldn’t 
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be there.”  A participant from one of the Inuvialuit agencies expressed that it’s “that 
hesitancy of not wanting to know what the real answer is because it could impact, and 
doing things on a project by project basis, you never really get to that.”    
 
 Another uncertainty raised concerned the issue of scoping.  One federal government 
participant commented that when deciding on boundaries, there is concern over where 
you decide to draw the lines.  This participant raised land fast coastal ice versus offshore 
open water, or land fast coastal ice and the shoreline, as examples. A participant from one 
of the Inuvialuit boards agreed, stating that “a lot of people are worried about lines on 
maps, and particularly government departments, because that’s where their jurisdiction 
begins or ends, and it does get into this other stuff of terrestrial versus offshore.”  
Uncertainty over timelines and time commitments was another issue of concern. One 
industry participant noted that R-SEA and similar types of initiatives do not always line-
up with the current project EA timeframes.  For example, “one of the reasons they can 
sometimes be a pain is because we have to work on schedules as a rule, because all of our 
exploration licences have a timeline; …a seismic program takes a long time…and to drill 
a single well will take three seasons, which essentially means three years.” The 
participant went on to explain that industry has schedules and timelines that it has to 
meet, and many stakeholders involved argue that regional assessments must be done 
before companies go forward with applications.  In the current context of the Beaufort 
Region the questions become will government “stop the clock on our exploration 
licences?”  the response is often “oh no, we [government] can’t do that, you [industry] 
have to continue with our schedule, but we are going to spend the next five years doing 
an REA…and we [industry] say, well you have just used up five of our years.” 
 
An unrelated timing issue, raised by a participant from the Inuvialuit Joint Secretariat, 
concerned the four year government cycle and the uncertainty this poses to planning long 
term.  The participant explained that “every three or four years there is a whole new 
bunch in charge and they don’t really care what happens 15 years down the line, they’re 
not going to be in power then.” The uncertainty issues raised was that under such 
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conditions the notion of “putting together something that’s going to be a 20-25 year plan 
is like they can say anything they want, quite frankly.”  
 
The final issue raised concerning uncertainty of a novel approach was the issue of 
tangible benefits.  One federal government participant saw issues with accountability as 
potentially reducing the real benefits of R-SEA, stating that “maybe you get some 
accountability, but maybe, because of the government culture, or bureaucratic culture, the 
results are not influential.”  One ENGO participant identified the potential loss of focus 
of important goals and values as a potential challenge with advancing R-SEA, explaining 
that “often times, with such planning exercises, there is a variety of stakeholders and they 
all have different interests, and some are interested in economics, or environmental, or 
cultural.” The participant went on to explain that “often times we want the landscape, or 
the ocean in this case, to do everything for us, and we don’t want to lose anything, and so 
with any EA plan, end plan, there needs to be some prioritizing of what values are more 
important than others, and setting of limits.”  In this context, concern was raised by a 
participant from one of the Inuvialuit co-management boards as to whether the R-SEA 
approach would benefit the local communities, noting that “it may very well be a risk, 
because they have, this region has been through a boom bust cycle twice now, …there are 
expectations, if they are not met, then of course there will be an impact…probably a 
negative one.”  
 
4.4.3 Adding another layer of bureaucracy with little benefit 
 
There was also some concern raised that R-SEA could become another layer of 
bureaucracy that stakeholders would have to engage in the study area, but with no real 
benefit. One ENGO participant noted that “if R-SEA is misperceived as just more red 
tape or bureaucracy, then it’s problematic.” A federal government participant noted 
similar concern, explaining that the latest initiative in the study area, BREA, may have 
become another layer in the regulatory process because it came too late; after the leases 
had been let out.  The participant noted that “BREA really was conceived at a time when 
two large exploration licences had already been issued in the deep water environment, so 
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there was no strategic question, the decision had already been made.” Another participant 
from industry echoed this sentiment, noting that “one might say that hindsight is a great 
thing, maybe that kind of a strategic assessment should have been done 35 years ago, but 
in my mind, as far as an SEA is concerned, I think the horse has already bolted from the 
barn on that one.”  
 
 
4.4.4 Loss of flexibility in decision making 
 
Finally, some participants raised concerns that stakeholders would be locked into a plan, 
foreclosing new opportunities that might emerge in the region. For example, a participant 
from the Inuvialuit Joint Secretariat noted that there is always going to be the issue of the 
loss of flexibility for decision making “because as soon as you put in something like a 
strategy, or you put in some sort of over-arching mechanism its going to be hard to 
circumvent it; there are always going to be issues that come up that are beyond our 
imagination, 'we didn’t see that one coming'.”   The participant continued, stating that “I 
don’t think Aboriginal people themselves feel comfortable locked into anything - even 
the community conservation plans, they are just that, they are not binding to 
anything…they don’t like being locked into anything.”  Another Inuvialuit board 
participant explained that “there’s a little bit of hesitancy and unwillingness to do long 
term planning initiatives that tend to set quotas or set things in stone for development   
because when you do that, for example, this organization then feels that their power has 
been taken away from them.”   
 
4.5 Opportunities and Challenges to Advancing a more Regional and Strategic EA 
in the Beaufort Region  
 
In order to move a regional and strategic EA approach forward in the study area, certain 
issues need to be addressed.  The following sections report on a number of issues 
extracted from the interviews that represent both opportunities and challenges to 
advancing R-SEA in the Beaufort region.  These include leadership, coordination of 
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interests, financial resources, legislated versus voluntary approaches, capacity, and 
‘other’ challenges.  
 
4.5.1 Leadership 
 
Participants were asked what the primary role of governments, industry, and Inuvialuit 
boards  and agencies would be in advancing R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea, as well as who 
should lead.  Participants were divided on the details, but the answer with the most 
support was that the federal government should be the lead agency with an array of 
suggestions for support.  One ENGO participant explained why the federal government is 
a good choice for a lead agency, explaining that “with the devolution of EA…this 
arguably is the area where the feds should become more involved…because of the 
potential for R-SEA to address trans-boundary cumulative effects, there is a reason for, 
because of its broader geographical scale…for the feds to be the leaders on this.”  As far 
as suggestions for support, all participants, with the exception of industry, suggested that 
the Inuvialuit boards and agencies should be a strong supporter to the federal government 
lead. One federal government participant explained that the Inuvialuit “are the people 
who are most likely to be affected by development, their engagement I think needs to be 
in making sure the right issues are being looked at, because they are on the ground, 
…feeling the affects of development, so its important that they be at the table” 
(Government, INAC).   
 
Another common view was that there should be co-management support, including the 
Inuvialuit boards and agencies, with industry input.  This was the view held by the 
majority of industry participants, with one stating that it should be a “multi-disciplinary 
thing, I think the government was going to take the leadership perspective on it, but the 
other two primary stakeholders, the Inuvialuit and industry, need to have a big say in the 
scope.”  However, some participants, particularly from the Inuvialuit boards and 
agencies,  disagreed, with one participant stating that they “didn’t know if industry 
should be involved too much, because the government are regulators and Aboriginal 
people are users of the land, and so I think they should be the decision makers. A 
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participant from the federal government agreed, stating that the lead agency “has to 
respect the governance of the region, which is Inuvialuit plus Canada.”   
 
Other suggestions for leadership, but with less support, included a steering board with 
support from the government; government and Inuvialuit sharing the lead; and a 
completely co-management led process.  Some participants separated ‘REA’ and ‘SEA’ 
to discuss leadership responsibilities, with one federal government participant noting that, 
with an SEA, the lead agency should be strictly government “because we know who 
makes the policy decision.”.  An industry participant agreed that “SEAs should be led by 
government agencies or authorities that actually make policy decisions”, and that REA 
should be led by regulators “like the NEB, Transport Canada, DFO, Environment 
Canada, and INAC to some extent.” 
 
As participants discussed leadership for R-SEA, there were also challenges raised.  For 
example, one ENGO participant raised a policy concern, stating that R-SEA “needs to 
have some accountability, so I would like to see that…it be connected to the government 
coming out with a policy statement on environment management in that region.” One 
federal participant was concerned about R-SEA turning into an umbrella statement, 
noting that “you run the risk, with these regional exercises, I think that they end up in 
motherhood statements, which isn’t going to help anybody either…our main goal is 
sustainable development…but what does that mean, operationally in the ISR?” Another 
federal participant thought that the biggest barrier facing the advancement of R-SEA was 
for the lack of a project management approach, where “…you’ve identified all the 
knowledge gaps and the issues that need to be addressed, and then you need to put money 
at it…and then have a project manager overseeing it from beginning to end…having the 
money to hire the experts because people in the region don’t have the time.” Still, others 
were unsure as to whether there was strong enough leadership to effectively run an R-
SEA initiative; otherwise “the risk is, you invest in this, and the results, the output is not 
viewed as being adequate” (Government, INAC).   
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4.5.2 Coordination of interests 
 
A second, and closely related, challenge was the perceived lack of willingness to 
coordinate, or a lack of coordination in respect to more regional and strategic EA 
approaches in the study area.  The majority of participants from all four groups spoke to 
this challenge, with one federal participant stating that “the biggest challenge is the 
continued coordination…just maintaining that momentum is always a challenge, because 
the reality is the project specific EAs come quick and fast, and they are upon you, and 
you get involved in doing those one offs, so its maintaining the momentum to carry 
through with these sort of longer, more detailed processes.”  Another federal participant, 
drawing upon past experience from BREA initiatives, noted that “sometimes you get 
three people at a meeting, and it’s their voice, and really, when you are doing the REA, it 
needs to be really clear what it means to the community and what it means to the future 
decision making process.”  An industry participant spoke to coordination challenges 
within the various stakeholder groups, noting that “the problem is that so many people 
and organizations have different views as to what constitutes these types of REAs and 
SEAs that I don’t know if you would ever get agreement.” A participant from one of the 
Inuvialuit co-management boards saw it more simply, stating that “it’s the integration of 
people’s activities” that is most challenging (Inuvialuit boards and Agency, FJMC); yet 
another participant thought that “institutional change” was the real challenge, particularly 
in terms of  “the multitude of  government agencies that you would have to draw 
together” to make R-SEA a success. 
 
4.5.3 Financial resources 
 
The majority of participants from all groups identified funding as the greatest challenge 
to advancing a system of R-SEA in the Beaufort Sea.  For example, one federal 
government participant said that “it could be extremely costly, especially in that area, 
being so remote and so harsh.” Similarly, another participant, from industry, explained 
that “if we do it right, the cost will come back and benefit everybody, but upfront, yes, 
somebody has to pay.”  
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The lack of funding commitment on behalf of the federal government was identified by 
all participants as a major constraint. One federal participant noted that the federal 
government may “fund the planning part, but they don’t fund the implementation side.” 
Another government participant, however, explained that the financial challenge had 
more to do with timing and capacity, stating that “when we are in a boom, because we are 
in a boom bust economy here, then all this work needs to be done, but really, the financial 
resources should almost be flipped to when there’s a low time, the financial resources 
should come into the community for things like an REA.” (Government, DFO).  An 
industry participant agreed that finances are a challenge, noting that “given what just 
happened with BREA, there’s not the financial resource right now; that just depends on 
what the priority is, and right now it seems that it’s not.”  A member of one of the 
Inuvialuit co-management boards echoed this frustration, noting “we just experienced it 
with BREA - it was a great proposal, it had a lot of work put into it, there was buy-in 
from industry and government departments that had been working on it,…they developed 
a good proposal and brought it up to the high level feds, and they said thanks but no 
thanks.”   
  
Almost all participants thought that the federal government that should be primarily 
responsible for financing R-SEA.  As one government participant explained, a “cost 
recovery model doesn’t make sense at a strategic level, so that means government has to 
pay for it.” An industry participant agreed, stating that “certainly on the SEA you want to 
see the government holding the purse strings, because they are the ones who are the 
resource manager, the land owner.” A participant from one of the Inuvialuit Boards 
further added that “the feds are the ones with money, and they are the ones who will get 
the royalty money, so they are the ones that should make most of the investment.”  
 
Others, however, suggested that a cost recovery model was optimal in that under this 
model industry could support the federal government to finance regional and strategic 
initiatives. These participants suggested that although the federal government should be 
responsible for initial financing, industry should provide significant support.  As one 
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federal government participant explained it should be “mostly the responsibility of 
government just to facilitate the costs associated with developing the initiative.” A 
participant from industry agreed, stating that “we think the government should pay 
upfront, make it all publically available to everybody, but we are prepared to pay a user-
pay system.” The participant went on to explain that it is “government’s responsibility to 
understand what’s going on regionally to see if development, how development should 
proceed, but if developers start using that information the government should recoup their 
money because the public paid for it.” A participant from the Inuvialuit Regional 
Corporation noted that industry already helps fund research in the study area, and “it 
helps to build a more sophisticated picture of what the processes are in the environment 
that you want to manage.”  
 
No participants suggested that the Inuvialuit boards and agencies should be responsible 
for funding regional and strategic EA initiatives.  One participant from the Inuvialuit 
Joint Secretariat noted that the Inuvialuit boards and agencies should not have to assist 
with funding such initiatives, because “obviously it has to be a shared financial 
responsibility, between government and industry.” But, as explained by one federal 
participant, “we have got this cabaret of people around the table, that love to engage in 
the philosophical discussions in the high level goal, but as soon as they broach the subject 
of implementation plans, everybody looks at their shoes.  Who’s going to cough up the 
resources; who is actually going to do the work?” 
 
4.5.4 Legislated versus voluntary approaches 
 
Participants were asked if the results of an R-SEA should be enforceable or voluntary in 
terms of directing development.  There was an almost even distribution between 
‘voluntary’, ‘legislated’, and ‘too early to tell’. Inuvialuit boards and agencies were the 
largest supporters of the voluntary approach, with few participants from government 
agreeing, and none from the industry and ENGOs.   
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Some participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies raised concerns over the 
legislation process, noting that, for example, “…legislating things can often times reduce 
your flexibility to do what maybe will work rather than what you think will work; I think 
it probably could be done voluntarily, because done the right way I think all players could 
see the benefit of this work being done…and it would be in their best interest to 
participate and contribute”.  Many other Inuvialuit participants echoed this sentiment, 
with one noting that “centrally driven policy initiatives I think are a thing of the past.”  
One federal participant noted that people are inclined to point the finger at the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency for regulation, saying “you have to codify this 
regional approach in legislation, and we pushed back and said no -it’s a responsible 
authority’s, a decision maker’s responsibility to understand and assume an appropriate 
level of risk, and an objective body like CEAA that administers a process is not in 
position to manage that risk for you.” 
 
The majority of industry and ENGOs, many government participants, and the minority of 
Inuvialuit agency participants supported a legislated approach.  One federal participant 
noted that there is already concern in the study area regarding the lack of ability to 
demonstrate regulatory efficiency. Industry agreed, with one participant noting that the 
lack of regulation and regulatory efficiency on many issues creates a very unstable 
regulatory system, and that “there is no putting anything to rest…you never get to say, 
ok, we have dealt with that, it’s always, lets continue to deal with that, and lets add new 
issues onto the table, and so, I see the legislated base, hopefully gives you some way to 
start addressing some of those concerns.” As such, some participants thought that a 
tighter legislated approach could help with this challenge, with one industry participant 
noting that  “if you do an R-SEA, because it’s not an actual application, it doesn’t have 
any actual legislated mandate, and something comes out at the other end, some kind of a 
conclusion, or a report, or recommendations or whatever, ...what do you do with it?”    
 
One government participant noted that “to get that certainty that people desire, I think 
that we need to have it enforceable”, with an industry participant similarly stating that 
“there needs to be a much tighter legislative base for R-SEA, right now, and that’s how 
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you start mitigating that risk. This participant went on to explain: 
“You need to see commitments from various regulators [because] …as the 
legislative situation stands right now it would just be a huge role of the dice for 
any company to go in and say, you know what, X, Y, and Z in my application are 
not there because I am relying on the information gathered from this REA.  And 
the regulator might say, I don’t recognize that, I want to see that information, you 
could see a challenge from the communities, you could see that challenge coming 
the NGO community, saying your application is incomplete, you haven’t 
addressed these issues.  And what is your legal base for recognizing, essentially a 
third party product, does that satisfy your legislative requirements?”  
Another industry participant agreed, stating that “you would want the results enforceable 
in some way [because] if you leave things voluntary, you can leave things in the grey 
[and] I would be worried that your just creating more ambiguity…I don’t know that in 
the Beaufort, in the North in general, that more ambiguity is what’s needed.” An ENGO 
participant also agreed, noting that R-SEA “has to have really clear policy connections 
from government as to what their accountability is, and how they are going to implement 
the plan, and that’s one of the risks I see with the approach in the Beaufort.”  Few 
participants from the Inuvialuit boards and agencies favoured legislation. Those that did 
were of the view that “in order for all the industrial companies to go ahead with a plan 
like that it has to be legislated; you can’t have one or two oil companies not working with 
this group, so if its legislated they’re going to have no choice.” 
 
All other participants either thought it was too early to tell or that a combination of both 
would be possible.  Those participants who thought it was too early to tell noted that they 
would be hesitant to legislate any process that hadn’t proven its value add to project EA.  
For example, one government participant noted that “you would have to be pretty careful 
with [legislating R-SEA], because it’s likely to be wrong, because it is regional and 
strategic, it’s likely to be correct only in generalities.”  Some participants thought a 
combination of voluntary and legislated models could be used, with one industry 
participant noting that “there may come a point when you move that from voluntary to 
something else, so a lot of it is not one thing all the time, its one thing at a point in time.” 
The participant explained that it’s really “about being mindful of what rolling from a no-
development, no-pre-planning scenario looks like, to one where it is fully managed, some 
degree of pre-planning, you know where your real environmental vulnerabilities are and 
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how to manage around them, and then through policy you signal what that needs to look 
like.” One participant, from the government of the Northwest Territories, agreed, stating 
that “there probably could be both, depending on what is set up, but it would definitely 
not be all legislation because its hard to change regulation and legislation or laws once 
they have been put in, and this has to be a living document where it changes with the 
times and conditions and the people.”  
 
 
4.5.5 Capacity 
 
The final issue concerns capacity, specifically human resources, monitoring, data and 
data sharing arrangements, as well as understandings of what R-SEA is and what it 
should deliver.  All groups raised human resources as a concern, with most agreeing that 
capacity may exist outside of the study area, but not wholly within it.  For example, one 
industry participant noted that “there certainly exists the capacity already with 
consultants and those kind of things, supported by people from the North, but like I said it 
wouldn’t be able to be run completely from the north.” A Inuvialuit board and agency 
member agreed, stating that “we, the Inuvialuit, don’t necessarily have the human 
capacity to do a bang up job, I think we could do it if we had to, but more people would 
always be better.”  An ENGO participant also mentioned that human capacity in the 
study area to undertake R-SEA was questionable, stating that “we are already overtaxed 
in the NWT in terms of the number of commitments for land use planning, and land and 
water management, so whatever comes has to be a realistic plan, it can’t be the biggest 
and largest assessment ever done.” One federal government participant raised concern 
over sustaining capacity, noting that “there is capacity to develop a lot of the issue around 
a regional and strategic EA, but again, not the human resource capacity to implement and 
sustain it.”  Finally, one federal government participant noted the human capacity 
challenges within government as a major concern, noting that “we have one scientist in 
Yellowknife…there is an issue in terms of capacity and understanding, the North and the 
northern processes, a lot of it can really create trouble for us up here because we’re 
[DFO] the ones having DFO scientists come up and we don’t even know they are here.”  
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Monitoring was the next largest capacity concern, noted by all groups.  One Inuvialuit 
board and agency participant indicated that “there is a need for research, there needs to be 
more planning, and of course monitoring, and it surrounds all of our indicators.” One 
participant from government stated that “if a REA is to be implemented, there would 
need to be an approach to regional monitoring [and] I think the capacity to develop …the 
regional monitoring exists, the capacity to implement it is limited, and the capacity to 
sustain it is non-existent.” Industry tended to agree, with one participant explaining that 
“ideally you set up your monitoring program to be able to inform and improve your 
assessment to make sure that you are looking at the right factors”, but the capacity to 
undertake this sort of monitoring currently does not exist.  Interestingly, one federal 
participant suggested that industry should be doing the monitoring, that “we don’t have 
the capacity…and, also, they usually get to choose what type of monitoring they do, we 
have a lot say, but…there is other monitoring we need to do as well.”  
 
Data were identified as presenting another constraint, but only the government and 
industry groups commented on this.  Some participants saw challenges with data 
synthesis and availability, while others noted proprietary challenges.  For example, one 
government participant noted that “if you talk to any scientist who does work in the 
Beaufort, they will say there is not enough information; if you talk to someone who 
oversees work in the Beaufort, of the number of scientists, they will say there is more 
data on the Beaufort than there is anywhere else in the world, or in the Arctic…so, I 
suspect it’s somewhere in between.”  However, this same participant went on to note that 
“there are still some critical gaps, and those critical gaps pertain mostly to the fact that 
Industry is moving into the deeper offshore, and focus has been on the near shore 
environment in the Beaufort.”  Industry also saw data synthesis as a challenge, 
commenting that “the first thing you need to do is actually some sort of an assessment as 
far as what do we know or not.”  The same participant raised other challenges as well, 
noting that “it’s either proprietary in the sense that they've paid for its collection and so if 
other people are going to be using it, they want to be reimbursed in some capacity, 
or…people are generally uncomfortable releasing their data; you need to find a way to 
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facilitate the data sharing and make things more transparent.”  A participant from the 
Inuvialuit Regional Corporation also identified a lack of data synthesis as a challenge to 
advancing R-SEA in the study area, noting that “nobody has taken it all and integrated, I 
don’t think there is a circulation model of the Beaufort Sea, maybe there is, but that is 
just an example of how disaggregated the data is.”  
 
The final capacity challenge, and the dominant theme underpinning this entire research, 
was the lack of understanding of what R-SEA is and what it should deliver.  For example, 
one government participant noted that “no one knows what REA or SEA is, there is no 
common definition, there is no common legislated requirement for it, there is no certainty 
as to the benefits that it might bring, there is a lot of theory out there, but there has not 
been a lot of practical examples.”  Industry also perceived this lack of understanding, 
with one participant stating that “there are all types of things it could deliver, and I think 
that’s where some of the current confusion lies, is that people look at something, like the 
BREA, and everyone had very different ideas of what that should involve and there was 
no sort of tight definition, which was one of our challenges early on.” As a participant 
from one of the Inuvialuit boards and agencies summed-up: “If you asked me to define 
SEA, I wouldn’t be sure of what it was.”  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
There are constant and consistent messages from government, industry, science and 
academia concerning the need to advance EA towards a more regional scale, and to the 
earliest stages of development decision-making processes (e.g., CCME 2009; Jenkins, 
2008; BSStRPA, 2007; Noble, 2002; Thérivel et al., 1992).  Applied primarily within the 
context of the federal Cabinet Directive (Dalal-Clayton and Sadler, 2005), SEA has been 
falling short of its many promises.  In response, the Canadian Council of Ministers of 
Environment recently endorsed R-SEA, thus providing a means for strategic-based 
assessment to be extended past the Cabinet Directive and a framework to facilitate more 
regional-based EA and planning initiatives at the strategic level of decision-making.  
Understanding of what R-SEA is and what it should deliver in Canada’s ISR, however, is 
still far from consolidated (Noble, 2009; Vicente and Partidário, 2006; von Seht, 1999).  
 
The Canadian Arctic, and in particular Canada’s Beaufort Sea, is at the threshold of 
major energy development. As energy companies embark on exploration in the region, 
and into Canada’s high Arctic in future years, there is both a need and an opportunity to 
develop and implement a system of R-SEA to facilitate regionally-based assessment of 
development initiatives at the strategic tier of planning before irreversible development 
actions are taken.  The purpose of this research was intended to examine the potential 
roles of and opportunities for R-SEA in the planning and assessment of Arctic energy 
initiatives.  Stakeholder knowledge of, and expectations about, strategic and regional EA 
were examined, as well as the perceived opportunities for and barriers to a system of R-
SEA for Arctic oil and gas exploration and development.  The research was focused on 
the Beaufort Sea in Canada’s Arctic region, the ISR, under the laws and regulations of 
the governments of the Canada and the IFA.  This chapter summarizes the primary 
research findings, and identifies future research needs and opportunities.   
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5.1 Efficacy of EA in the ISR  
 
The dominant theme that emerged concerning ‘what’s working’ with regard to current 
EA in the Beaufort Sea, identified by nearly half of the study participants, was 
consultation and engagement.  This suggests that the settled land claims in the ISR appear 
to be working effectively with regards to Inuvialuit participation in impact assessment 
processes.  Participants noted that there is considerable consultation occurring between 
industry and the Inuvialuit, and that the current regulatory system provides good 
protection for the Inuvialuit.  Others noted strong engagement between industry and 
regulators, particularly the NEB.  This is a good indicator that when more regional and 
strategic initiatives begin to advance, the consultation and engagement foundations have 
been established, thus, and in keeping with the intended benefits of R-SEA, allowing for 
a regional vision to be established based on stakeholder engagement and collaborative 
processes. That being said, there were those participants who identified few, if any, 
positive characteristics of the current EA system. This is likely a reflection of the 
frustration of those particular stakeholders during the more recent exploration initiatives 
in the ISR, and may help explain, in part, why recently more regional and strategic EA 
initiatives have been high on the agenda.   
 
There were, however, many challenges raised concerning the current regulatory system in 
the ISR.  These included challenges specific to the practice of EA, such as a lack of data, 
a lack of data synthesis and reliability, the lack of a regional approach, an inability to 
effectively address cumulative effects, and concern over dated policies and legislation.  
Another was uncertainty and efficiency, related in part to the multiple players involved, 
evidence as to whether EAs actually work anymore, volatile economic environments, and 
issues with time frames related development and decision making processes.  Other 
challenges raised included duplication and coordination issues with the overlapping IFA 
and CEAA processes, as well as human and financial capacity issues.   
 
These challenges speak both to the limitations of EA, and to expectations that participants 
were placing on EA that the process was never likely designed to deliver.  Many, if not 
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all of these challenges, however, could potentially be addressed with the introduction of a 
more regional and strategic approach to EA in the ISR.  Results suggest that government, 
industry and the local communities are in agreement that there is a need for an approach 
like R-SEA in the ISR.   
 
There was no consensus on whether these challenges mentioned above were unique to the 
offshore region.  About half of the participants identified the challenges as something that 
both onshore and offshore development are facing, stating that the settled land claims in 
the ISR actually might make the offshore region easier to navigate than the onshore areas.  
The other half of the participants saw these challenges as unique to the offshore 
environment, noting specific challenges like the complex regulatory system, the lack of 
development thus far, and technical challenges like drilling in deep water, ice, the lack of 
data, and the high costs of offshore development.   
 
5.2 Knowledge of R-SEA  
 
Though there is agreement on the need of a more regional and strategic approach to EA 
in the ISR, there was no consensus amongst participants as to the nature and scope of 
REA, SEA, and R-SEA and what each is intended to deliver.  Two schools of thought 
emerged when participants were asked to describe the fundamental purpose and 
advantages to a more regional and strategic approach.  The first group, comprising 
slightly more than half of the participants, and consisting of mainly participants from the 
Inuvialuit boards and agency group, viewed regional and strategic EA as ‘the same thing’ 
- or R-SEA.  The fundamental purpose and advantages identified for R-SEA included 
increasing certainty or clarity of the regulatory system in the Beaufort Sea, identifying 
data gaps, establishing a regional database, developing a regional vision and a future plan 
for the offshore region, addressing regional issues so that project EA can be more 
focused, potentially establishing ‘no-development’ zones, contributing to adaptive 
management and finally, facilitating increased consultation and better engagement.   
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The second group, consisting of mainly the government and industry participants, 
identified regional and strategic EA as separate processes, or ‘REA’ and ‘SEA’.  These 
participants saw the fundamental purpose and advantages of SEA to be dealing with 
policy decisions (e.g. spill regulations, same season relief wells, best practices, standards 
and regulations, rights issuance), providing scope for REA baseline data collection, 
increasing certainty for industry, facilitating earlier consultation, and helping off-ramp 
the large issues from project EAs to a more regional platform.  Many of these participants 
also mentioned the Cabinet Directive when discussing SEA, suggesting that they saw 
SEA as more of a higher-level EA process, but only within at federal level.  The 
fundamental purpose and advantages of REA, as described by this second group of 
participants, included that it should provide an ongoing monitoring system, involve the 
collection of a regional database, as well as provide a regional vision and a plan for the 
future.  As discussed in chapter two, there really is no ‘formal’ REA, and many people 
refer to it in many different ways.  In truth, REA is not really an environmental 
‘assessment’ so much as it is a regional study, or data collection on a regional scale.  
Others who refer to REA with strategic purposes were often speaking to the principles of 
more strategic processes, such as SEA or R-SEA.   
 
Though it would appear on the surface that the above two groups are looking for two 
different processes, suggesting that there is little consensus, there is actually considerable 
overlap in terms of the expectations, mandates, and deliverables of regional and strategic 
EA, regardless of disagreement over the ‘REA,’ ‘SEA,’ and ‘R-SEA’ terminology (see 
Table 5).  The first group, those who viewed REA and SEA as ‘the same thing’, or R-
SEA, identified the same traits as raised by the second group who separated R-SEA into 
REA and SEA.  This would suggest that both groups are actually looking for a process 
that delivers a number of fundamental outputs, but are describing these deliverables using 
different terminology.  As noted in chapter two, one of the challenges with advancing a 
more regional and strategic approach is getting involved stakeholders to come to a 
common understanding and as seen here, the terminology continues to be a constraint.  
Terminology, however, is not significant enough hindrance to discount implementing R-
SEA in the ISR.  Though, a standardized terminology would be beneficial to help 
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advance R-SEA initiatives.  Terminology aside, results indicate that stakeholders in the 
ISR do agree with the fundamental principles of R-SEA and are seeking similar benefits.  
 
Table 5: Participants views of REA, SEA and R-SEA.   
 
Fundamental Purpose and Advantages Group 2 Group 1 
 REA SEA R-SEA 
Should address policy decisions  X X 
Develop a regional vision and future plan X X X 
Identify data gaps  X X 
Establish a regional database X  X 
Regional long-term monitoring X  X 
Addresses regional issues to focus project EA  X X 
Establish protected areas or ‘no-development’ zones  X X 
Contribute to adaptive management X  X 
Facilitate increased consultation and better engagement  X X 
Increase certainty and give clarity to regulatory system  X X 
 
 
Participants were asked to discuss how they perceived other participant’s views of a more 
regional and strategic process.  Most acknowledged that there is little agreement and a 
lack of understanding.  For example, participants from the government group identified 
varying opinions on what a regional and strategic EA was, thought that industry was 
looking for certainty, and observed that many Inuvialuit did not even know what it was.  
Participants from industry perceived confusion within the federal government, thought 
that ENGOs were “all over the board,” and generally saw that everyone is seeing the 
process differently right now.  Inuvialuit board and agency participants agreed that no 
one is coming at this process in the same way.  They saw industry concerned with 
certainty, and government concerned about loosing some of their responsibilities, and 
generally being hesitant to take it on.  Given the common goals and expectations 
identified above, many of these perceptions may not be reality and stakeholders in the 
region would benefit from an open dialogue on R-SEA, if not a common ‘white paper’ 
detailing its principles and characteristics.  
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5.3 Potential Benefits and Risks 
 
Notwithstanding the differences in terminology, a number of common benefits or 
expectations were identified by participants.  Participants thought that an R-SEA could 
help identifying data gaps and construct a regional database.  Another perceived benefit 
was improved regulatory decision making, such as having enough information for 
regulators to make more informed decisions, as well as the possibility of establishing ‘no-
development’ zones.  Better planning for development in general was also seen as a 
benefit, adding the ability to establish a regional vision and future plan, allowing a look at  
the whole region when making EA decisions, finding patterns that help predict 
development capacity levels, as well as holding stakeholders to decisions made.   
 
Stakeholders themselves were perceived to receive greater certainty, such as managing 
risk, identifying challenges ahead of time so that the regulatory and political environment 
is well understood, and ensuring tighter timelines for project reviews and approvals.  A 
benefit that SEA has yet to effectively address that stakeholders thought R-SEA would 
address was more effective management of cumulative effects.  Participants also saw R-
SEA as clarifying the regulatory process and expectations, such as what type of 
development is appropriate for a region, as well as dealing with regional policy issues 
that project-based EA should not be addressing.  Many also perceived improved 
communication and local involvement as an added benefit, with earlier and more focused 
consultation, as well as incorporating traditional ecological knowledge into the process.   
 
Finally, participants raised the perceived benefit of more meaningful project-based EA, 
discussing the idea of ‘off-ramping’ regional issues onto an R-SEA so that project-based 
EA could focus on more specific details, as well as reducing cost, and allowing EA and 
R-SEA to be a cyclical adaptive process.  Most of these perceived benefits match up 
nicely to the intended benefits R-SEA is supposed to deliver, as discussed earlier in 
Chapter two.  This is further evidence that even though participants were using different 
terminology there exists a common set of principles.   
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At the same time, there were several perceived risks to R-SEA that were identified by 
participants.  Some saw the movement towards a more regional or strategic EA process 
as something that would mean potentially foregoing anticipated development 
opportunities.  Arguably, this is not specifically dealing with environmental risks per se; 
in fact, it may be what is needed of R-SEA in order to protect some of the more sensitive 
areas of the Beaufort Sea.  Some were also concerned that R-SEA would interfere with 
current EA time frames, potentially disrupting current development proposals.  Another 
perceived risk was the upfront cost of R-SEA.  However, many participants noted that 
after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010 the government was much more willing to fund 
such initiatives.  Another potential risk identified by participant was the concern that R-
SEA is a new approach, and there are no examples of one being done.  Participants stated 
that the benefits needed to be clearly outlined before they would view it as uncertain 
certain process, and that there might be issues with scoping the boundaries of an R-SEA 
initiative.  Some participants were concerned that R-SEA could just add another layer of 
bureaucracy, stating that many leases are already out in the ISR and these regional 
assessments might already be too late.  Finally, some participants saw a potential risk of 
reducing the flexibility of decision making.  For example, if stakeholders are potentially 
locked into a plan it reduces flexibility as well as reduces the chance for adjustments and 
adaptive management.   
 
It is important to recognize participant’s concerns regarding the potential move toward a 
more regional and strategic EA process in the Beaufort region.  If stakeholders in the ISR 
do not recognize benefits from such a process, it might not be worthwhile to continue 
down this path.  It will be important to draw upon lessons and experiences with R-SEA 
and R-SEA-like applications elsewhere, either internationally in the offshore environment 
or nationally in the terrestrial environment, to more clearly identify and demonstrate the 
deliverables of R-SEA.   
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5.4 Opportunities and Challenges to Moving Forward  
 
In order to move forward and advance R-SEA in the Beaufort region, there are a number 
of issues that need to be addressed including leadership, coordination of interests, 
financial resources, legislated versus voluntary approaches, and capacity.  Many of these 
issues are not unique to R-SEA or to the Beaufort, but are important to when attempting 
to implement a more regional and strategic form of planning and assessment in general.   
 
Participants were asked to discuss who they thought would be a good lead agency for R-
SEA initiatives, and the response with the most support was that the federal government 
should take this position.  The idea behind this was that the federal government is the best 
organization set up to deal with trans-boundary cumulative effects, as well as to 
implement policy or legislation and enforcement.  All groups but industry noted that the 
Inuvialuit boards and agencies should be a strong support to the federal government, 
allowing decisions to reflect the local communities’ regional vision.  Some participants, 
however, thought that there should be no lead agency, and more of a co-management 
structure established.  This idea, however, was criticized by others who said that R-SEA 
will need strong leadership to achieve its intended benefits.  Some participants also stated 
that industry should not be in the lead group for an R-SEA because it is the Inuvialuit and 
Federal government that should be making decisions for the region.  One possible means 
forward is that R-SEA policy decisions are by the federal government and the local 
communities, and regulators lead the database collection, monitoring, and cumulative 
effects assessments with the input or collaboration of industry though project-specific 
actions.   
 
Coordination of interests was another major challenge identified.  For example, getting 
involved stakeholders to agree upon what R-SEA is and what it should deliver will need 
to be addressed before any benefits to this new approach will be realized.  The perceived 
lack of willingness to coordinate by the government and industry groups was another 
challenge.  Technically, SEA is a requirement for the federal government, as outlined in 
the Cabinet Directive, and, as such, is already supposed to be occurring.  But convincing 
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the federal government should not be difficult when one considers all of the benefits they 
themselves would receive.  First, conducting an R-SEA would be in accordance with the 
federally supported Arctic mandate to protect the fragile environment in the ISR.  And 
second, an R-SEA would improve the efficiency of project based EAs to the point that it 
would reduce the costs, shorten the time lines, and in general, produce better EAs.  
Concerns over R-SEA “setting things in stone” and government and industry not wanting 
to “know the outcomes” was something that was identified as a constraint to advancing 
R-SEA. However, as innovative tool with the intention to protect the environment from 
un-mitigated development, these may just be issues that stakeholders in the area need to 
adjust to if offshore development is to proceed sustainably.   
 
Financial resources were another challenge raised by participants, which was evident 
after the BREA initiative was turned down this previous year.  After the Gulf of Mexico 
spill in 2010 however, the federal government changed its mind and decided to fund 
BREA, which suggests that financial resources are available when an initiative is deemed 
politically important.  As one ENGO participant put it, “we just need to sell the idea 
better”.  In this regard, most participants thought that the federal government should be 
supplying finances for R-SEA initiatives, with support from industry, who could 
contribute on a cost recovery model.  None of the participants thought that the Inuvialuit 
boards and agencies should bear the costs of R-SEA.   
 
Participants were divided evenly into three groups on legislated versus voluntary-based 
R-SEA: some thought it should be voluntary; some thought it should be legislated; and 
others simply thought it was too early to tell.  Those in support of a voluntary approach 
were primarily participants from Inuvialuit boards and agencies, and saw legislation as 
something that would reduce flexibility in the regulatory system.  Industry, ENGOs and 
some federal government participants disagreed, and thought that a legislated approach 
would produce greater certainty, be enforceable, less ambiguous, and provide a measure 
to mitigate risk.  The third group, consisting mainly of government, thought it was too 
early to decide which approach would work best, and that R-SEA needs to prove its value 
before it’s legislated.  It was suggested that a combination of voluntary and legislated 
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approaches would be most effective, starting in a more voluntary way, and slowly 
building a legislated backing.  This may be the most viable option, such that stakeholders 
could see the benefits and eventually, after proving its effectiveness, R-SEA could 
become a part of the legally required steps in environmental assessment in Canada.   
 
Finally, capacity was identified as a challenge to advancing of R-SEA in the ISR. 
Amongst the primary concerns were limited human and financial resources, a lack of 
data, as well as a lack of data synthesis and regional monitoring area capacity. These are 
issues that need to be addressed before R-SEA process can be effectively implemented, in 
order to ensure their success and long-term viability.   
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Major energy development is looming in the Inuvialuit Settlement Region in Canada’s 
Arctic, but there is currently no form of regional or strategic EA to help plan for future 
energy development, to establish a long-term regional vision, or to assess and effectively 
manage the potential cumulative effects of energy development initiatives.  The recently 
federal-funded BREA initiative does show some promise in this regard, at least in terms 
of establishing a regional environmental baseline, and can be seen as a first step in 
moving the ISR towards a more regional and strategic approach to EA, and ensuring that 
involved stakeholders see a benefit in doing so.  However, there remains both the need 
and the opportunity to advance beyond current initiatives for regional baseline data 
collection and monitoring to implement R-SEA prior to major planning and development 
decisions being made. This requires that what R-SEA is and what it should deliver are 
agreed upon by those stakeholders involved.   
 
Notwithstanding emerging BREA initiatives, and though consultation and engagement 
may be working within the current regulatory system, the challenges are enough that 
change needs to happen for effective environmental protection as large scale energy 
development looms in the Beaufort Sea.  Though participants do not agree on R-SEA 
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terminology, this research suggests that there is an identifiable common need for R-SEA 
in the ISR region, and an emerging common set of expectations in terms of its 
deliverables. There is also a need to develop the local intellectual capacity, specifically in 
the areas of science and environmental management, in the Beaufort in order to advance 
R-SEA.  Future research is needed to address the perceived risks and challenges raised by 
participants for R-SEA to be a worthwhile and effective process.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
THEME 1: Perceptions of the current state of practice of EA and regulatory 
approach to offshore oil and gas in the Beaufort region   A. What is working regarding the current approach to EA and regulation for offshore oil and gas in the Beaufort region?  B. What would you identify as the main challenges or constraints to the current system/approach?  
Listen to response, then probe to see if there are any additional issues (e.g. 
overlap and duplication of efforts; redundancy amongst project EAs; 
complexity of the process; data or technical issues; other?) 
 C. Are there issues or challenges that are unique to offshore activities?   
THEME 2: Knowledge of regional and strategic EA   A. Do you see any advantages to a more regional or strategic approach to EA in the Beaufort Sea?  B. What, in your view, should such a process be delivering? For example:  a. What is the fundamental purpose? b. What should it deliver and to whom? c. What is the potential value‐added (to industry, communities, regulators, etc)? d. Is there a value lost? (greater risk, uncertainty, costly?) e. How would it (or should it) differ from the current approach?   C. How do you see REA/SEA linking up with, or informing other types of planning and regulatory systems/frameworks? a. For example, value added/lost to project‐based EA? b. How might EA feed into or help support REA/SEA?   D. Do you think other groups/stakeholders perceive REA/SEA the same as you/your company does?     
  103 
   
THEME 3: Requirements to advance a more REA/SEA approach   A. IF a system of regional/strategic EA were to advance in the Beaufort Sea:   a. Who should play what roles? What would be the primary role of governments, industry, Inuvialuit boards/agencies?  i. Who would lead? ii. How should it be financed?  b. How should it be managed? In other words, should R‐SEA be regulated?  i. Should the results be enforceable or voluntary in terms of directing development?   B. Is there currently the capacity to develop, implement, and sustain a system of regional and strategic EA in the Beaufort Sea? a. Human resources b. Financial resources c. What sorts of data or knowledge are needed to make R‐SEA work? d. Data sharing arrangements e. Monitoring programs f. Other issues about capacity  
THEME 4: Barriers/Challenges   A. What do you perceive to be the most significant challenges/barriers to advancing REA/SEA in the Beaufort? a. Are any of these challenges unique to the offshore environment?  
 
 
THEME 5: Lessons learned/Benefits emerging   A. BREA wasn’t funded this fiscal year, but looking back on the discussion to date, what would you identify as the key lessons learned?  
 
 
